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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Franchising 
The popularity of franchising as an organizational form is an established fact. 
Particularly, in developed countries, franchising makes a significant 
contribution toward the economy by service provision and creation of 
employment opportunities (Spinelli, Rosenberg, & Birley, 2004).  In general, 
franchising refers to a relationship where a firm (franchisor) sells the right to 
use its brand name, operating systems, and product specifications to a person 
or a firm (franchisee) who is permitted to market franchisor’s 
products/services within a specific geographical area and time period (Combs 
& Ketchen, 2003). The franchisor also undertakes to assist the franchisee 
through advertising, promotion, and other business activities as stipulated in 
the franchise contract. On the other hand, the franchisee is obliged to follow 
the methods and procedures prescribed by the franchisor in the franchise 
agreement. Typically, the franchisee pays an upfront amount (called franchise 
fee or initial fee) and a variable percentage of sales (called royalties) to 
his/her franchisor. However, some franchise systems charge a fixed periodical 
amount or both (variable and fix) in lieu of royalties.  
In this chapter, I briefly discuss the background of this organizational 
form and present the objective and the organization of this dissertation.  
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1.1.1 Background 
The word “franchise” has been derived from the Anglo-French word “franc” 
that means “to free” or “freedom or immunity from some burden or 
restriction”1.  The history of franchising can be traced back to 19th century. 
However, there are several contradicting stories regarding the origin of 
franchising. First, some sources trace the origin of franchising back to 1840s 
when the beer makers in Germany granted pubs and taverns the right to sell 
beer under brewer’s brand name and license (Hackett, 1976). Second, some 
others believe that the modern form of franchising was originated by the 
Singer Company (Hackett, 1976), a sewing machine producing company, in 
1860s when they did not have enough money to pay salaries to their 
salesmen. They created a network of dealers and these dealers paid a fee to 
Singer instead of asking for salaries.  There is a third group of historians who 
believe that franchising was originated in England when the government 
granted some selected persons the right to collect taxes on its behalf and 
retain a fee for this service (Hoffman & Preble, 1991). The historians have 
disagreement regarding the place of origin of franchising as well, some 
consider it a European innovation (Hackett, 1976; Hoffman & Preble, 1991) 
while others term it as a typical American innovation (Castrogiovanni, Combs, 
& Justis, 2006a; Dant, 2008). 
 
                                                 
1
 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary  
http://www.merriam-webster.com  
(accessed on March 15, 2010) 
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1.1.2 Why do Firms Franchise?  
The previous research offers several theoretical explanations for the use of 
franchising. Researchers from a broad spectrum of disciplines (for example, 
economics, management, marketing, sociology, entrepreneurship) have 
investigated the basic question of why and when firms use franchising (Jindal, 
2006). This dissertation applies organizational economics and strategic 
management theories to explain the use of various forms of franchising; 
therefore, some of the relevant key answers to this important question are 
briefly discussed here.  
Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1968) resource scarcity view is considered one 
of the core reasons behind using franchising and in this way franchisees 
support franchisors’ expansion by financing the opening of new outlets 
(Cliquet, 2000a), paying fees  and royalties, and sharing risk (Combs & 
Ketchen, 1999). This resource scarcity view argues that the firms face capital 
scarcity at the start of their life cycle hence they are motivated to use 
franchising to meet their capital requirement for growth and expansion. As the 
system gets mature, the firms can have better access to the financial 
resources and the severity of financial resources scarcity is reduced. It 
prompts the franchisor to buy back the profitable units from the franchisees 
that leads to the ownership redirection hypothesis. Therefore, the firm’s 
tendency to use franchising decreases with its maturity and better access to 
the capital resources. Several researchers, for details see the meta-analysis 
by Combs and Ketchen (2003), have investigated this resource scarcity 
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argument as a reason behind the use of franchising. However, a notable 
number of researchers do not agree to the capital scarcity hypothesis alone 
and find other explanations, such as agency theory and transaction cost 
theory, more plausible (Norton, 1995). Behavioral risk at the outlet is an 
important determinant of the franchising strategy. The managers at the outlets 
are assumed to be self-interested and that they will sacrifice the firm’s interest 
to achieve their own goals (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Franchising creates a 
powerful incentive for the outlet managers to act more cooperatively and look 
after the interests of the franchisor (Shane, 1996). This argument for the use 
of franchising becomes even more relevant when the monitoring of the outlet 
managers is difficult and costly (Lafontaine, 1992).  
Minimizing transaction costs is another reason behind the use of 
franchising by the firms (Klein, 1980; Manolis, Dahlstrom, & Nygaard, 1995). 
Property rights theory (Hart & Moore, 1990) can also be used as an 
alternative explanation for the use of franchising (Windsperger & Dant, 2006). 
There are some other theoretical frameworks as well that have been used in 
the previous research to explain the use of franchising; these include 
signaling theory (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003; Gallini & Lutz, 1992; Lafontaine, 
1993), organizational learning theory (Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Sorenson 
& Sørensen, 2001), and risk sharing view (Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; 
Roh, 2002). The main research questions of these theories refer to the 
explanation of royalties, initial fees and the proportion of company-owned 
outlets. 
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1.2 Multi-unit Franchising 
Franchising is not a monolithic organizational form (Garg, Rasheed, & Priem, 
2005) and the franchisors often have to choose between different 
organizational forms within franchising. The expansion of franchising networks 
by opening up franchised outlets can be based on two ownership strategies: 
Single-unit franchising (SUF) and multi-unit franchising (MUF). Under SUF, a 
franchisee operates only one outlet. On the other hand, in the case of MUF 
arrangement, a franchisee operates two or more outlets at multiple 
geographical locations in the same franchise system. The major difference 
between SUF and MUF arises from the outlet level ownership status. In the 
case of SUF, the outlet manager is the owner and bearer of the residual 
income risk. On the other hand, the outlets in an MUF setting are managed by 
the hired managers who are employees of the multi-unit franchisee. 
The phenomenon of MUF can be divided into two types i.e., area 
development multi-unit strategy and sequential multi-unit strategy (Kaufmann, 
1993; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). In the first case, the franchisee has the right 
to open a certain number of outlets in a particular geographical area during a 
specified time period, and in the second case, the existing franchisee is 
granted the right to sequentially open up additional outlets (Grünhagen & 
Mittelstaedt, 2005).  
In this research, I focus on the franchisor’s choice between SUF and 
MUF. I don’t distinguish between sequential MUF and area development. The 
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variable of my interest is the number of franchised outlets associated with one 
franchisee regardless of its mode (i.e., sequential MUF or area development). 
These may include units allotted either through sequential expansion or 
through area development. The objective of this research and the research 
questions addressed in this dissertation are explained in the next section.   
 
1.3 Research Objectives, Evidence, and Implications  
A major portion of recent growth in franchising business can be attributed to 
the emergence of MUF (Dant, Kacker, Coughlan, & Emerson, 2007; 
Grünhagen & Dorsch, 2003; Kaufmann, 1993). Despite having emerged as an 
increasingly growing phenomenon in franchising, MUF still remains an under-
researched area. In the past, the main focus of franchising research has been 
on SUF. 
 
1.3.1 Research Deficit 
Although several empirical studies were published on MUF in the last two 
decades, the research deficit primarily results from the lack of theoretical 
foundations of this ownership strategy. Some of the previous studies apply 
agency theory or resource-based view to investigate MUF while many of them 
do not apply any specific theoretical framework. The meta-analysis by Combs 
and Ketchen (2003) suggests that agency theory is the most widely used 
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framework to explain the use of franchising, they highlight the need for 
application of theories other than agency and resource scarcity theories to 
explain the use of franchising. Garg et al. (2005) also suggest that theories 
other than agency theory should be used to explain the franchise’s choice of 
franchising strategy and that factors like uncertainty should be employed to 
investigate the use of various forms of franchising.  
Starting from this deficit, there is a need to apply multiple theories, 
based on organizational economics and strategic management, to explain this 
network form (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; 2006b).  
1.3.2 Research Objective 
As an attempt to address the research deficit described above, the aim of this 
research is to contribute toward the under-researched phenomenon of MUF 
by  
(1) explaining the franchisor’s choice between single-unit 
franchising and multi-unit franchising using 
organizational capabilities view, transaction cost theory, 
and property rights theory and 
(2) presenting empirical evidence from the German and 
Austrian franchise sectors. 
I attempt to extend the MUF literature by developing and empirically 
testing the hypotheses from resource-based and organizational capabilities 
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views, transactions cost theory, and property rights theory. Qualitative and 
quantitative research methods are employed in order to test the theoretical 
predictions regarding the use of MUF. I present empirical results from a 
survey of the German franchise systems and case study insights from the 
Austrian franchise sector. 
1.3.3 Empirical Evidence 
Since this dissertation mainly uses data from the German franchise systems, I 
provide a brief overview of the German franchise sector. In Germany, like 
many other European countries that do not have separate regulations for 
franchising, franchising is defined as per European Code of Ethics for 
Franchising developed by the European Franchise Federation (EFF)2.    
“Franchising is a system of marketing goods and/or services 
and/or technology, which is based upon a close and ongoing 
collaboration between legally and financially separate and 
independent undertakings, the Franchisor and its individual 
Franchisees, whereby the Franchisor grants its individual 
Franchisee the right, and imposes the obligation, to conduct a 
business in accordance with the Franchisor’s concept. 
The right entitles and compels the individual Franchisee, in 
exchange for a direct or indirect financial consideration, to use 
                                                 
2
 European Code of Ethics for Franchising 
http://www.eff-franchise.all2all.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a13.pdf 
(Accessed on November 12, 2010) 
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the Franchisor’s trade name, and/or trade mark and /or service 
mark, know-how, business and technical methods, procedural 
system, and other industrial and /or intellectual property rights, 
supported by continuing provision of commercial and technical 
assistance, within the framework and for the term of a written 
franchise agreement, concluded between parties for this 
purpose” 
In 2009, there were 960 franchise systems operating in Germany. 
These franchise systems had 58,000 franchised outlets and were employing 
452,000 people in the country. The economic output of the German franchise 
sector was Euro 48 billion in 2009 and it is contributing to economic and social 
development of the country by employing a considerable number of people 
and by service provision. Although the contribution of German franchise 
sector to the GDP is relatively lower, as compared to the United States, but 
still it has a huge potential. The franchising industry in Germany, like in other 
countries of the world, is continuously growing. The number of franchised 
outlets has grown over 80% in the last decade. The retail sector is the largest 
industry employing franchising and the use of this organizational form is 
increasingly becoming popular in other sectors as well e.g., services sector 
(Ehrmann & Meiseberg, 2010). 
  However, it would not be unjust to say that franchising in the most of 
the European countries is still in its early stages and is mostly unregulated. 
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Only five countries in Europe (Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, and Romania) 
require the pre-sale disclosure3. On the other hand, the code of ethics of 
European Franchise Federation is self-enforced in 17 European countries 
(Perala, 2007). The German Franchise Federation (DFV) was established in 
1978 and has operational cooperation with EFF and the World Franchise 
Council (WFC). DFV is a membership association of the franchisors in 
Germany and does not hold any regularity or legal mandate. It sets quality 
standards and code of ethics for the franchisors. Table 1.1 (appended below) 
presents an overview of the German franchise sector.  
Table 1.1: German Franchise Sector 
 1998 2009 Growth 
Franchise Systems  630 960 52.38 % 
Franchised Outlets  31,000 58,000 87.10 % 
Employees 320,000 452,000 41.25 % 
Source of information: German Franchise Federation4 
1.3.4 Managerial Implications 
The choice of ownership strategy can have far-reaching implications for the 
survival and performance of a franchise system. The findings based on 
organizational capabilities view suggest that the franchisors should consider 
                                                 
3
 European Franchise Federation (EFF) 
http://www.eff-franchise.all2all.org/spip.php?rubrique7  
(Accesses on November 12, 2010) 
 
4
 Franchise Facts 2010  
http://www.franchiseverband.com/index.php?id=71&L=1   
(accessed on May 9, 2010)  
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using a higher proportion of MUF if their system-specific know-how is highly 
non-transferable. The franchisors should also use a higher proportion of MUF 
if they possess a high brand name capital as this organizational form enables 
them to exercise more control due to higher monitoring capabilities. The 
transaction cost findings suggest that the franchisors should use a higher 
proportion of MUF if high transaction-specific investments are required to 
startup a new franchised outlet. On the other hand, the franchisors should 
dominantly use SUF in order to cope with adaptation problems created by a 
highly uncertain local market environment. Furthermore, the findings based on 
property rights hypotheses advocate that the franchisors should consider 
using SUF if the franchisee’s local market knowledge are very intangible and 
hence of key importance for the creation or residual income at the local 
outlets. This would enable them to efficiently exploit the local profit 
opportunities.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into two major parts. The first part comprises of   
the following two studies/chapters:  
a. Chapter two presents a detailed review of the MUF literature. In this 
chapter, I review the existing empirical research on MUF in a 
chronological order and then I analyze these studies in the light of 
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theoretical frameworks applied therein. I also analyze the research 
deficit to build the foundations of my research.  
b. In chapter three, I present an integrative model to explain the 
franchisor’s use of MUF. I develop hypotheses from transaction cost 
theory, agency theory, resource-based and organizational capabilities 
views, property rights theory, and screening theory. This model 
presents the possible extensions in the MUF literature, and parts of this 
model are empirically tested in the second half of the dissertation.  
The second part of this dissertation presents the empirical studies 
conducted to test the hypotheses concerning organizational capabilities 
view, transactions cost theory, and property rights theory. This part 
comprises of the following three studies. 
c. In chapter four, I use a comparative case analysis method to explain 
the franchisor’s use of MUF. This study presents insights from a 
qualitative analysis of the two Austrian franchise systems, one with 
extensive use of MUF and the other with extensive use of SUF. 
Hypotheses derived from agency theory, resource-based and 
organizational capabilities views, and transactions cost theory are 
examined in this study using the qualitative data. The findings of this 
study are partially compatible with the hypotheses. 
d. The fifth chapter of this dissertation presents a quantitative study to 
explain franchisor’s use of MUF from organizational capabilities and 
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transactions cost perspectives. The empirical data from the German 
franchise sector supports all four hypotheses proposed in this study. 
e. In chapter six, I apply a property rights view to explain the use of MUF 
from a franchisor’s perspective. This study also uses quantitative data 
from the German franchise sector to test the three property rights 
hypotheses, two of them are supported by the empirical results. 
The last chapter (chapter seven) presents the conclusion of this 
research. This chapter includes the theoretical and managerial 
contributions of this dissertation. I also discuss limitations of my research 
and its findings in this chapter. In the end, I conclude my dissertation by 
presenting some directions for the future research. Figure 1.1 appended 
on the next page summarizes organization of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
Examination of MUF Literature1 
In this chapter, I present the development of empirical literature on MUF.  This 
chapter is divided into three sections. First section presents the chronological 
development of literature on MUF; in section two, the theoretical foundations 
of MUF literature are analyzed; and finally, literature deficit and research gap 
are discussed in the third section.  
 
2.1 Evolution of the Empirical Literature  
The phenomenon of MUF has been investigated since 1980s. This section 
presents evolution of MUF literature in the last three decades. All empirical 
studies that directly or indirectly investigate MUF are briefly reviewed in a 
chronological order.  Table 2.1, appended at the end of this chapter, presents 
an overview of the empirical studies on MUF. It may be noted that 
findings/hypotheses pertaining to only MUF are discussed in this section and 
are presented in Table 2.1. 
In one of the pioneer studies on MUF, Zeller, Alchabal, and Brown 
(1980) discuss various advantages of MUF systems. They compare SUF to 
                                                 
1
 A condensed version of chapters 2 and 3 was presented at the 23rd Annual International 
Society of Franchising (ISoF) Conference held in San Diego (California) on February 12-14, 
2009 and has been published in the Journal of Marketing Channels (Volume 17, No.1, pp. 3-
31). 
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master franchising in market penetration and locational conflict context and 
reveal that the franchisor, under MUF, has to coordinate one franchisee 
instead of several single-unit franchisees, which results in reduced 
management problems. A relatively lower level of conflicts between franchisor 
and franchisee typically characterizes MUF networks. MUF can help both 
franchisor and franchisee achieve their short and long run goals.  
Kaufmann (1993) formulates and compares several strategies for the 
allocation of new units in franchise systems. These strategies include SUF, 
area development franchising, non-projected sequential MUF (new units are 
allocated to existing franchisees based on performance tests and continue to 
permit expansion until the performance falls below the expected level), and 
the projected sequential MUF (the franchisor projects ahead the effect of 
allocation of unit to existing franchisees and places a limit on allocating units 
to the franchisee even if the performance still meets the expected level). By 
applying simulation method, the author shows that area development 
franchising has the lowest performance among all four strategies and that 
sequential MUF may perform better as compared to single-unit strategy. The 
sequential MUF is used as a reward strategy by the franchisors and increases 
motivation of the franchisees. On the other hand, the franchisors are reluctant 
to use area development franchising due to increased influence of 
franchisees. However, the ease of control is one of the major factors 
motivating franchisors to use area development franchising.  
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According to Robicheaux, Dant, and Kaufmann (1994), mature 
franchise systems use a relatively higher proportion of MUF compared to new 
franchise systems. In addition, they conclude that franchisors expecting 
management problems with MUF operation have a relatively lower proportion 
of area development agreements and that various business sectors have 
different proportions of MUF. The franchisors are motivated to use MUF due 
to ease of selection, training, and managing the multi-unit franchisees. This 
study uses empirical data from the US fast food industry only. 
Kaufmann and Kim (1995) make two important contributions toward the 
MUF literature. First, they empirically verify the use of master franchising and 
reveal that a vast majority (67.5%) of franchisors use area development and 
that all franchisors in the study use master franchising. Second, they find a 
positive relationship between the use of MUF (master franchising and area 
development) and system growth rate. However, they do not investigate the 
causal effect in this relationship. They argue that the franchisor has to screen, 
recruit, and train fewer multi-unit franchisees compared to large number of 
single-unit franchisees that accelerates the system growth rate. On the other 
hand, the counter argument, that faster growing systems are in a better 
position to attract multi-unit franchisees, is also not ruled out in this study.  
Based on franchisors’ perception, Bradach (1995) in his exploratory 
study presents a model with four primary management challenges. These 
include system growth, uniformity, local responsiveness, and system wide 
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adaptability. The study investigates that how well SUF and MUF can cope 
with these challenges. The author, based on analysis of the qualitative 
empirical data collected from five fast food franchise chains operating in the 
USA, found that MUF systems can address certain management challenges 
in a more effective way as compared to SUF systems, particularly, the issues 
related to system growth and system-wide adaptation. The multi-unit 
franchisees are more efficient in adding new units and they can be easily 
convinced to adapt system-wide changes. The findings reveal no significant 
difference among SUF and MUF with regard to uniformity. On the other hand, 
SUF may outperform MUF in terms of local responsiveness as the single-unit 
franchisees possess higher level of local market knowledge and, compared to 
MUF, can react more promptly to the local market changes and requirements.   
Kaufmann and Dant (1996) also confirm the positive relationship 
between MUF and growth rate. They mainly build their argument on the basis 
of resource scarcity theory. The MUF provides better access to capital which 
results in higher system growth. In addition, they argue that MUF better aligns 
the incentives of franchisor and the franchisee that ultimately results in 
increased growth. Their hypothesized negative relationship between area 
development agreements and system growth is not empirically verified. The 
study was conducted using primary data from fast food industry in the USA.  
By analyzing survival data from franchise and non-franchise small 
firms, Bates (1998) finds empirical support that the new units allocated to 
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existing franchisees enjoy lower risk of failure. The findings reveal that single-
unit franchisees are not in a much better position with regard to the survival 
risk as compared to independent small firms. However, franchised units part 
of mini-chains and operated by larger establishments have lower risk of 
failure. The author argues that multi-unit franchisees are larger partners and 
have greater experience and better access to resources than newcomer 
single-unit franchisees. The findings also suggest that the franchised outlets 
purchased from previous franchisee have a higher degree of failure risk.  
Dant and Nasr (1998) investigate the Lebanese market and 
hypothesize a positive relationship between MUF and upward flow of 
information in the franchise networks. They compare single-unit and multi-unit 
franchisees in terms of their willingness to provide information to their 
franchisors. However, they find that all franchisors in their sample are using 
MUF so they could not test the relevant hypothesis. Additionally, they argue 
that previous research also suggests that the franchisors are more likely to 
use the MUF in distant markets. Therefore, all franchisors in their sample use 
MUF.  
Dant and Gundlach (1999) investigate MUF in the context of 
dependence and autonomy in franchised channels. The authors argue that 
multi-unit franchisees are much dependent on their franchisors due to the lack 
of alternative opportunities and that they feel more secure as compared to 
single-unit franchisees. Additionally, multi-unit franchisees are responsible for 
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managing the mini-chains and they are likely to spend much of their time in 
implementing the franchisor’s procedures. Hence, they hypothesize that MUF 
will lead to higher level of perceived dependence and lower level of desire for 
autonomy at the franchisee’s end. The analysis of empirical data from 176 
franchised outlets in 26 fast food chains in the USA confirms both of the 
hypothesized relationships.  
Bercovitz (2003) investigates the use of MUF as a governance form to 
mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior of franchisees. She argues that 
shirking and free-riding can be reduced by providing franchisees an 
opportunity to become a multi-unit franchisee. In addition, she examines the 
relationship between two performance outcomes (system termination and 
litigation rates) and system structure. The franchisor is less likely to use 
disciplinary measures (contract termination, litigations, etc.) if the franchisee 
does not show opportunistic behavior. The data from 96 food retail and 
automotive franchise chains in the USA support the hypotheses suggesting 
that offering MUF reduces the system termination and system litigation rates 
and that concentration of MUF will increase the likelihood of franchisee’s 
opportunism by depressing the expectations of ex-post rents for the remaining 
single-unit franchisees. Hence the franchisors are likely to use disciplinary 
mechanisms in such a situation.   
Wadsworth and Morgan (2003) collected data from American and 
Canadian franchise systems to investigate propensity of MUF. The results 
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indicate that the franchisors are motivated to adopt MUF to increase the 
growth rate of their systems, and more units are awarded to existing 
franchisees as a reward strategy. Approximately 80% of the franchisees are 
single-unit while rest 20% are multi-unit franchisees. These multi-unit 
franchisees operate more than 50% of the total franchised outlets. An average 
multi-unit franchisee owns 4.46 units while an average franchisee owns 1.69 
units. The proportion of MUF varies with industry and some industries (for 
example, automotive, fast food, retail, and services) use higher proportion of 
MUF.  
Bercovitz (2004) applies agency cost and resource scarcity theories to 
MUF. She argues that MUF is positively related to the geographical distance 
between franchisor’s headquarters and franchised outlets. On the other hand, 
franchisors that expect higher shirking costs are likely to use higher proportion 
of SUF. In case of MUF, the franchisee can earn higher economic rents and 
finds little motivation for cheating. Hence, MUF reduces the risk of free-riding 
and provides a cost-effective method of mitigating free-riding hazards.  
Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) investigate question about the extent of 
use of MUF and how new units are allocated to the franchisees. They use 
data on all new restaurants opened in Texas by seven major fast food chains 
between 1980 and 1995. The findings reveal that 49% of the franchisees in 
the seven franchise chains under study are multi-unit franchisees and they 
operate 84% of the total franchised outlets.  They found that franchisors prefer 
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existing franchisees to allocate new units and, particularly, to the franchisees 
that presently operate unit(s) close to proposed location of the new unit. In 
addition, they argue that reduction in monitoring costs and efficiency benefits 
associated with MUF can compensate franchisor for disadvantages of MUF 
created by divided attention and increased bargaining power of franchisees.  
Kalnins and Mayer (2004) show that local market knowledge gathered 
by a franchisee plays an important role for the success of subsequent units 
opened by him in the same geographical area. The authors argue that 
franchised outlets benefit both from locally and distantly gained congenital 
knowledge, however, the predicted negative effect of the congenital 
knowledge gained distantly was not found significant. The study uses data 
from the pizza restaurants in Texas, USA.  
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) argue that understanding 
franchisees’ expectations are very important for effective management  by the 
franchisor. They investigate the US fast food franchise systems to explore the 
motivations of sequential multi-unit franchisees and area developers. The 
study hypothesizes that sequential multi-unit franchisees are mainly motivated 
by their entrepreneurial ambition while area developers are more investment 
oriented.  The findings suggest significant difference between the two groups 
of franchisees. However, they could find empirical support for only one of their 
two hypotheses – that sequential multi-unit franchisees are more likely to seek 
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fulfillment of their intrinsic need.  Both groups, sequential multi-unit 
franchisees and area developers, are equally investment oriented.  
 Garg et al. (2005) investigate factors that influence the franchisor’s 
adoption of MUF. The results indicate that the franchisors that plan for rapid 
expansion are more likely to use MUF and, within MUF setting, they are likely 
to employ higher proportion of area development compared to sequential 
MUF. The results also suggest that the franchisors that place more emphasis 
on uniformity are more likely to use a relatively higher proportion of area 
development agreements rather than sequential MUF. Conversely, the 
franchisors focusing more on local responsiveness are more likely to use 
sequential MUF agreements. These results are in agreement with the findings 
of an earlier study by Bradach (1995) who revealed that SUF is likely to 
perform better in terms of local responsiveness. The sequential MUF is, 
generally, considered closer to SUF as compared to area development MUF. 
The proposed negative relationship between MUF and local responsiveness 
and the proposed positive relationship between MUF and uniformity could not 
be confirmed by the empirical results. 
Jindal (2006), in his doctoral thesis, applies agency theoretical 
perspective to explain the use of various forms of MUF (area development, 
master franchising, and sequential MUF). He argues that the franchisors use 
MUF to address monitoring challenges in the hierarchical relationship by 
shifting the burden to multi-unit franchisees. The secondary data collected in 
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the USA from Bond’s Franchise Guide and uniform franchise offering circulars 
(UFOCs) partially support the propositions regarding the positive relationships 
of the use of MUF with free-riding, difficulty in monitoring, and franchisee 
recruitment process.  
In recent years, important contributions on MUF were published by 
Scott Weaven and his research colleagues. Weaven and Frazer (2006) 
examine the motivational factors of single-unit franchisees and multi-unit 
franchisees. They argue that the franchisors need to take into consideration 
whether they want to recruit the franchise partners who will remain single-unit 
franchisees or select and develop the franchisees for multi-unit ownership. 
They investigate Australian franchise sector and collect qualitative data from 
franchisees within McDonald’s franchise system. Their findings suggest 
significant differences between single-unit and multi-unit franchisees in terms 
of their motivations behind entering into the franchise partnership. The multi-
unit franchisees place more emphasis on business concept, potential for 
expansion, ongoing training, involvement in decision-making process, and 
governance structure. On the other hand, single-unit franchisees give more 
importance to franchisor’s brand, initial training, operational freedom, and 
potential for employment of family members.  
Weaven and Frazer (2007a) apply agency theory and resource-based 
view to explain MUF. They use convergent interviews to test their nine 
propositions presented in the article, five out of them are empirically 
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supported. The findings reveal that franchisors that perceive higher agency 
costs tend to use a higher proportion of MUF. In addition, the relationships 
between adoption of MUF and system uniformity and higher brand value are 
positive and significant. The results suggest that franchisors, generally, have 
a strategy to reward high-performing franchisees with multi-unit contracts. 
However, MUF’s positive relationships to system-wide adaptations, local 
market innovation, and franchisor’s perception of future chain franchisee 
opportunism could not find empirical support. 
Weaven and Herington (2007) employ a multiple-case study approach 
to show that the choice of governance structure and human resource 
management (HRM) policies are influenced by size and age of franchise 
system and the nature of the industry. The results indicate that less mature 
and small franchise systems use lower proportion of MUF and less-
sophisticated HRM policies and, conversely, large and mature franchise 
systems use higher proportion of MUF and more-sophisticated HRM policies. 
In addition, they argue that MUF networks share information more effectively 
and are more likely to adopt system wide adaptations compared to SUF 
systems. 
Weaven and Frazer (2007b) conducted a study of 19 Australian 
franchise systems to test their hypotheses about relationships between the 
characteristics of franchise system and its adoption of MUF. A qualitative 
research design was adopted for collection of the empirical data. They found 
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positive relationships between MUF and age, system size, system 
corporatization, and use of plural forms. They also evidence a negative 
relationship between level of conflict and MUF. They argue that a system 
having a higher level of conflict may be less attractive for multi-unit 
franchisees, and such franchise systems face difficulties in recruiting area 
developers. However, this negative relationship shows a contradiction with the 
results of a later study (Weaven, 2009), where the author reports a positive 
relationship between MUF and the level of conflict. 
Empirical results from Germany (Cochet, Dormann, & Ehrmann, 2008) 
indicate that the objectives of franchisee and franchisor are better aligned in 
MUF compared to SUF networks. They argue that multi-unit franchisees are 
less likely to show opportunistic behavior and that franchisors have higher 
stakes attached to multi-unit franchisees compared to single-unit franchisees. 
Hence, the franchisors are likely to remain in relationship with multi-unit 
franchisees for a longer period of time. The study proposes that MUF 
weakens the relationship between autonomy and relational governance. 
However, the authors could find only a weak support for their hypothesis. 
Lopez-Bayon and Lopez-Fernandez (2008) delve into Spanish 
restaurant industry to investigate the existence of economic rents and 
difference in the level of rents perceived by single-unit and multi-unit 
franchisee. They use archival and primary data of 151 franchisees. The 
results indicate that ex-ante and ex-post rents do exist in franchise systems. It 
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is quite interesting to know that multi-unit franchisees earn significantly higher 
ex-post rents. This could be a result of lower costs due to higher experience 
and motivation of the multi-unit franchisees. Ex-ante rents are also higher in 
case of multi-unit franchisees; however, this difference is not statistically 
significant.  
Vázquez (2008) investigates the complementarities between MUF and 
contract length. The author explores the Spanish franchise sector by 
collecting primary data from 145 franchise system. Firstly, the author argues 
that a single-unit franchisee is the residual claimant; hence, he has higher 
motivation that results in reduced moral hazards at the outlet level. If 
monitoring at the outlet level is very difficult and complex, this would lead to 
franchisor’s lower tendency toward MUF. This relationship is empirically 
verified in this study.  Second, the argument regarding the free-riding hazards 
is also presented in this study. In contradiction to the first argument, MUF 
reduces the risk of free-riding by the franchisee. Multi-unit franchisees have 
lower incentives to free-ride and shirk on providing quality service. Therefore, 
the importance of free-riding hazard is positively related to MUF. Franchisors 
offer longer contracts to multi-unit franchisee to mitigate this problem. MUF is 
a form of reward given to the franchisees performing above the expectations 
of the franchisor. The analysis of the data supports complementarities 
between length of contract and propensity to use MUF.  
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Weaven (2009) examines Australian franchise sector to explore the 
reasons behind franchisors’ decision to adopt MUF. The study hypothesizes 
seven factors that influence franchisors’ adoption of MUF. These factors 
include franchise system maturity, degree of corporatization, intra-firm conflict, 
geographical dispersion, reward strategy, and system growth. The author 
proposes positive relationships between the use of MUF and all of the 
predictor variables except intra-firm conflict. However, the empirical analysis 
provides support only for a positive relationship between system maturity and 
the use of MUF. Additionally, relationship between the degree of 
corporatization and the use of MUF is also weekly supported. Interestingly, 
the study proposes a negative effect of the system conflict on the use of MUF; 
however, the findings suggest a significant positive effect between these two 
variables. This contradicts to the results from the previous research 
(Bercovitz, 2004; Weaven & Frazer, 2007b) which confirms the negative 
relationship between MUF and the system conflict (including litigation).   
Finally, a recent study by Gomez, Gonzalez, and Vázquez (2010) 
shows that MUF is positively related to franchise system density (number of 
franchised units in relation to population). The authors argue that the risk of 
free-riding is lower in a dense franchise system. In addition, it is easier for a 
multi-unit franchisee to manage his mini-chain in highly dense systems. Their 
data from Spain also support the hypotheses that larger franchise systems 
and franchise systems operating in sectors with non-repetitive customers use 
relatively more MUF. The authors argue that non-repetitive customer base 
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increases incentive for free-riding for the franchisees. Therefore, franchisors 
use higher proportion of MUF to mitigate this problem at the outlet level. The 
positive relationship between the use of MUF and system growth rate is not 
supported. Although several previous studies (Bradach, 1995; Garg et al., 
2005; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Wadsworth & Morgan, 2003) evidence the 
positive relationship between system growth and the use of MUF, the Spanish 
data did not support this hypothesis. 
 
2.2 Empirical Literature and Theoretical Frameworks  
As previous research is reviewed, it is important to identify the theoretical 
frameworks used and the hypotheses investigated in the previous empirical 
studies on MUF. Thus, I analyze the empirical research results in the light of 
agency theory, resource scarcity and organizational capabilities views, and 
transaction cost theory (see Table 2.1). 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
In the recent years, agency theory has been the primary foundation for the 
majority of the studies on franchising (Garg et al., 2005).  In franchising, 
agency relationship exists between the franchisor (the principal) and the 
franchisee (the agent) and both the counterparts have their own goals and 
interests (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The business performance depends mainly on 
the franchisee’s input while the franchisor is not sure about the level of input 
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being made by the franchisee. The information asymmetry between both the 
partners creates agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 Garg et al. (2005) argue that the early MUF researchers found it 
difficult to explain its use from an agency theoretical perspective, which 
prompted several of them to apply agency theory to investigate this form of 
franchising arrangement. Consequently, we have several studies that apply 
agency theory as theoretical background.  The findings of these studies 
suggest that MUF can address number of agency problems in a more 
effective way compared to SUF (Bercovitz, 2004; Garg & Rasheed, 2003; 
Garg et al., 2005; Gomez et al., 2010; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Kalnins & 
Mayer, 2004; Vázquez, 2008; Weaven & Frazer, 2007b). Especially, multi-unit 
franchisees are better motivated to reduce the monitoring costs. The 
franchisors use MUF to shift the burden (in terms of monitoring) to the multi-
unit franchisees (Jindal, 2006). Geographical contiguity of franchised units is 
one of the important factors that play role in adoption of MUF. The franchise 
system with a higher number of geographically contiguous units is more likely 
to use a higher proportion of MUF. SUF mitigates the risk of shirking at the 
outlet level, as the franchisees are the residual claimants. When the 
franchisor has a strong brand name, there is a higher risk of free-riding by the 
single-unit franchisees. The franchisors prefer MUF as compared to SUF to 
reduce the risk of free-riding at the outlet level (Bercovitz, 2004; Brickely, 
1999; Gomez et al., 2010; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Vázquez, 2008). 
Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) argue that multi-unit franchisees 
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provide better quality of goods/services as compared to single-unit 
franchisees because shirking on quality would affect the multi-unit 
franchisee’s business in the local network and ultimately his/her profitability. 
Consequently, MUF system is a governance form that reduces monitoring 
costs and risk of free-riding compared to the SUF system. The use of MUF 
better aligns the goals of franchisee with those of franchisor resulting in a 
reduced conflict in the franchise system (Zeller et al., 1980). There are several 
other incentives attached to MUF in addition to the higher economic rents. 
The period of franchise contract is longer in case of MUF compared to SUF 
(Vázquez, 2008).  In this way, the multi-unit franchisees are rewarded for 
higher performance and the incentive created by MUF is further strengthened. 
On the other hand, MUF has a negative relationship with system termination 
and litigation rates (Bercovitz, 2003). Hence, it can be concluded that the 
relationship between the franchisor and the multi-unit franchisee lasts longer 
compared to that of single-unit franchisee. 
2.2.2 Resource Scarcity View  
In franchising, resource scarcity theory explains the use of franchising as a 
means to overcome the scarcity of resources (i.e., capital, managerial 
resources, and local market assets). Under the capital scarcity perspective, 
MUF systems have a relative advantage over SUF systems (Kaufmann & 
Dant, 1996). Multi-unit franchisees are larger partners and have better access 
to capital to finance system growth. Empirical studies show that MUF and 
system growth are positively related (Bradach, 1995; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; 
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Kaufmann & Kim, 1995). Kaufmann and Kim (1995) argue that franchise 
systems with a higher growth rate are in a better position to attract high-
quality franchisees as multi-unit partners.  
Contrary to the predictions of resource scarcity theory, the use of MUF 
increases with size and maturity of the franchise system (Gomez et al., 2010; 
Weaven & Frazer, 2007b; Weaven & Herington, 2007). This may be explained 
by the fact that size and maturity are indicators of greater organizational 
capabilities of the MUF system (Bradach, 1995; 1998). MUF increases the 
organizational capabilities (such as monitoring, knowledge transfer, and 
innovation capabilities) and, consequently, strengthens the competitive 
position of the system. System uniformity, system-wide adaptations, and 
system corporatization are examples of organizational capabilities (Bradach, 
1995; 1998; Weaven & Frazer, 2007a; 2007b). The franchisors that focus on 
system uniformity, system corporatization, and system-wide adaptations are 
more likely to use MUF.  
2.2.3 Transaction Cost Theory 
Originated by Coase (1937) and further developed by Williamson (1979; 
1983; 1985), transaction cost theory argues that a “transaction cost” is 
associated with each economic exchange. This theory makes two important 
assumptions regarding the behavior of the managers - bounded rationality 
and opportunism.  Environmental uncertainty, information asymmetry, and 
asset specificity are the major determinants of the transaction costs.  Some 
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recent researchers, for example, Baker and Dant (2008), term transaction 
cost theory as a macro-oriented version of agency theory as both of them 
focus on the principal-agent relationship. The higher transaction-specific 
investments increase the hold-up risk and hence the ex-post transaction costs 
(Klein, 1980; Manolis et al., 1995). Simultaneously, such investments may 
also create the risk of opportunistic behavior by the receiver of transaction-
specific investments (franchisor).  MUF provides a solution that mitigates the 
risk of opportunistic behavior at either end.  In the MUF literature, only one 
study – Bercovitz (2003) – applies transaction cost theory to explain this 
ownership strategy. She argues that MUF increases the franchisee’s quasi-
rents and thereby increases the self-enforcing range of the franchise contract 
(Klein, 1995). The increase in long term economic rents of MUF franchise 
decreases his incentive to show opportunistic behavior to gain short-term 
profits. Therefore, the self-enforcing range is higher under MUF compared to 
SUF.  
 
2.3 Research Deficit 
The analysis of the literature on MUF has shown that both the franchisor and 
the franchisee may realize efficiency advantages if they choose a multi-unit 
strategy. Although several empirical studies exist on MUF, the major focus of 
previous research has been on the motivations behind entering into multi-unit 
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arrangements. The major research deficit on MUF arises due to the following 
issues.  
 The majority of studies on MUF apply agency theoretical view. In 
addition, a few studies use resource scarcity perspective as theoretical 
foundation of their hypotheses (see Table 2.1 for the details). However, 
except the agency cost explanations, most of the hypotheses lack a 
theoretical foundation. Several important determinants of the 
ownership strategy have not been investigated in the MUF context. 
Especially, the influence of environmental uncertainty, transaction-
specific investments as a bonding device based on transaction cost 
theory, the  effect of contractibility of assets (for example, system-
specific assets, local market knowledge assets, and financial assets) 
based on property rights theory  (Windsperger & Dant, 2006) on the 
use of MUF has not been studied. Therefore, I argue that the previous 
research lacks in systematic application of transaction cost theory, 
property rights theory, and organizational capabilities view to explain 
the franchisors choice of ownership strategy within franchising. 
 The analysis of the existing MUF research reveals that majority of the 
studies use primary or secondary data from fast food sector only 
(Gomez et al., 2010). Although several of these studies present their 
own justification for using data from a single industrial sector, however, 
a sample from one industrial sector may not necessarily be 
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representative of the overall population. Hence, the generalizabilty of 
the results is hampered by the use of single-sector data (also refer to 
Table 2.1 for the details).  
 The German and the Austrian franchise sectors, among many others, 
remain completely untouched by the MUF researchers. Although few 
studies (Gomez et al., 2010; Lopez-Bayon & Lopez-Fernandez, 2008; 
Vázquez, 2008) probe Spanish franchise sector, the overall European 
markets remain much under-researched in the MUF context. The 
empirical results from the European countries, other than Spain, can be 
a valuable contribution to the MUF literature.  
Starting from this deficit in the literature, I attempt to extend existing MUF 
literature by applying organizational economics and strategic management 
theories.  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter presents a detailed review of literature on MUF. First, I discuss 
the evolution of MUF literature in a chronological order. Second, the empirical 
literature is analyzed in the light of theoretical foundations used therein. Third, 
I also discuss the research deficit. Majority of the previous studies apply 
agency theory to investigate the use of MUF. The analysis of the literature on 
MUF has shown that both the franchisor and the franchisee may realize 
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efficiency advantages if they choose a multi-unit strategy.  Although some 
studies apply resource scarcity perspective, however, the primary research 
deficit of the existing literature results from the lack of systematic application 
of the theoretical frameworks.  
Table 2.1 containing the summary of evolution of the MUF literature is 
appended on the next pages.   
 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
     
 
 
 
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
37 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
 
        
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
38 
  
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
 
 
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
39 
 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
40 
 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
 
 
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
41 
 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
 
42 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
  
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
43 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
 
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
 
44 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
45 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                            
                          Chapter 2                        Examination of MUF Literature
                                           
 
46 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising                       Chapter 3       MUF: Development of an Integrative Model 
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                                                                         47 
Chapter 3 
MUF: Development of an Integrative Model1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the literature on MUF in the previous chapter has shown that 
both the franchisor and the franchisees may realize efficiency advantages if 
they choose a multi-unit strategy. Although several empirical studies exist on 
MUF, majority of the studies apply agency theoretical view. In addition, a few 
studies use resource scarcity perspective as theoretical foundations of their 
hypotheses. However, except the agency cost explanations, most of the 
hypotheses lack a theoretical foundation. Several important determinants of 
the ownership strategy have not been investigated in the MUF context. 
Especially, the influence of environmental uncertainty, transaction-specific 
investments as a bonding device based on transaction cost theory, the  effect 
of contractibility of assets (for example, system-specific assets, local market 
knowledge assets, and financial assets) based on property rights theory 
(Windsperger & Dant, 2006) on the use of MUF has not been studied. 
Therefore, I argue that the previous research lacks in systematic application 
of, transaction cost theory, property rights theory, and organizational 
capabilities view to explain the franchisors choice of ownership strategy within 
franchising. 
                                                 
1
 A condensed version of chapters 2 and 3 was presented at the 23rd Annual International 
Society of Franchising (ISoF) Conference  held in San Diego (California) on February 12-14, 
20009 and has been published in the Journal of Marketing Channels (Volume 17, No.1, pp. 3-
31). 
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Starting from these deficits, there is a need to apply multiple theories to 
explain this network form (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; 2006b; Combs & 
Ketchen, 1999). In this chapter, I attempt to develop an integrative view on 
MUF by extending the existing literature in the following way: First, I apply 
transaction cost approach by investigating the influence of environmental 
uncertainty and bonding effect of transaction-specific investments on the 
choice of ownership strategy; second, I propose hypotheses based on the 
agency theory; third, I develop hypotheses based on the resource-based and 
organizational capabilities views; fourth, starting from the property rights 
theory, I propose the influence of contractibility of resources on the choice of 
ownership strategy; and finally, I examine the ex-ante screening effect of the 
franchisee’s higher transaction-specific investments that strengthens the ex-
post bonding effect compared to SUF. Figure 3.1 (appended on the next 
page) summarizes the integrative model.  
 
3.2 Development of an Integrative Model 
3.2.1 Transaction Cost Theory 
According to Williamson (1975; 1979; 1983; 1985), transaction-specific 
investments and environmental uncertainty are the major determinants of 
governance mechanism.  
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Transaction-specific Investments 
Transaction-specific investments (as selfish investments) of the franchisee 
have the following effect on the governance structure: If the franchisee is a 
multi-unit owner, he or she has to undertake higher transaction-specific 
investments to open up the local network compared to SUF. Conversely, the 
additional investment costs are decreasing with the number of units in the 
mini-chain. This bonding effect increases the franchisee’s dependency and 
hence his or her motivation to act cooperatively.   
In addition, franchisee’s investments also increase the franchisor’s 
dependency, if these investments have both a selfish and cooperative 
element (Che & Hausch, 1999). The cooperative effect results from synergies 
between franchisee’s and franchisor’s investments that increase the self-
enforcing range of franchise contracts (Klein, 1995). Consequently, I can 
derive the following proposition: The higher the bonding effect of the 
franchisee’s transaction-specific investments under MUF compared to SUF, 
the higher is the tendency toward MUF. 
Hypothesis 3.1: Franchisee’s transaction-specific investments 
are positively related to the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF. 
Environmental Uncertainty 
Although Williamson (1975) extensively discussed the role of 
uncertainty/complexity for the choice of organizational form, few studies 
investigate the influence of this factor on the choice of governance 
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mechanism (Anderson, 1985; Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990; Noordewier, John, 
& Nevin, 1990). The impact of environmental uncertainty on the governance 
mechanism is ambiguous and several unanswered questions need further 
investigation (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Based on Simon’s (1947) 
information processing view of organization, higher environmental uncertainty 
requires more local information processing capacity (Prendergast, 2002). 
Applied to franchising, the higher the environmental uncertainty at the local 
market, the more local information processing capacity is required to acquire 
and process the relevant local market knowledge (Bradach, 1995; Campbell, 
Datar, & Sandino, 2009) and the lower is the tendency toward MUF.  
Hypothesis 3.2: Environmental uncertainty is negatively related 
to the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF. 
3.2.2 Agency Theory 
According to the agency theory (Brickley, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991; 
Lafontaine, 1992), agency costs result from behavioral uncertainty, owing to 
shirking and free-riding of the network partners. Compared to SUF, MUF can 
mitigate these agency problems by creating a stronger incentive system for 
the franchisees. Higher motivation of the franchisees at the local outlets 
results in lower shirking under MUF compared to SUF. Conversely, additional 
monitoring costs may arise, owing to agency problems between franchisees 
and their outlet managers in the mini-chains. However, economies of 
monitoring and coordination of the mini-chains may mitigate this effect 
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(Grünhagen & Mittelstaedt, 2002; Weaven & Frazer, 2003). In addition, the 
stronger incentive effect of MUF compared to SUF may also result in lower 
free-riding risk (Bercovitz, 2004). Free-riding risk concerns the probability that 
the franchisor’s brand name is tempered by the franchisee’s opportunistic 
behavior. I can derive the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.3a: Behavioral uncertainty, due to shirking, is 
positively related to the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.  
Hypothesis 3.3b: Behavioral uncertainty, due to free-riding, is 
positively related to the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF. 
3.2.3 Resource-based and Organizational Capabilities Views  
Resource-based View  
According to the resource scarcity view, the franchisors do not possess 
enough local market knowledge and financial resources at the beginning of 
the franchise life cycle (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968) . 
SUF enables them to overcome this scarcity problem. The question to ask is: 
Does MUF additionally mitigate this scarcity problem for the franchisors?  
First, local market knowledge can be more efficiently acquired by 
single-unit franchisees compared to employees of  the multi-unit network 
because the single-unit franchisee (as residual claimant) has higher 
entrepreneurial capabilities and is more motivated to exploit the profit 
opportunities at the local market than the multi-unit employee. Conversely, 
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sequential MUF has efficiency advantages compared to area development 
MUF because sequential MUF functions as promotion scheme—through the 
lens of tournament theory—to sort franchisees on the basis of their 
entrepreneurial capabilities (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1993; 1999; 
Rosen, 1982). 
Hypothesis 3.4a: The importance of local market know-how of 
the franchisee is negatively related to the franchisor’s tendency 
toward MUF.  
Hypothesis 3.4b: This negative effect of local market know-how 
of the franchisee is higher under area development MUF 
compared to sequential MUF. 
In addition, the importance of local market know-how of the franchisee 
as an entrepreneur to create residual income varies positively with local 
market uncertainty. Frank Knight (1921), in the early part of the last century, 
even argues that uncertainty is origin of the entrepreneurial role to seize 
opportunities for profit. The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more 
relevant is the outlet-specific knowledge of the franchisee for creation of 
residual income of the network, and the lower is the tendency toward MUF. 
Hypothesis 3.4c: The negative effect of franchisee’s local market 
know-how on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases 
with local market uncertainty. 
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Second, financial resources scarcity of the franchisor may result in a 
higher tendency toward franchising to finance the expansion of the system. 
MUF offers additional growth opportunities for the franchisor compared to the 
SUF, because multi-unit franchisees are less constrained in financing the 
local investments compared to the single-unit franchisees. As a result, I derive 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.5: Franchisor’s financial resources scarcity is 
positively related to his tendency toward MUF. 
Organizational Capabilities 
Based on March (1991), the organization of the firm has two functions:  
1. Exploitation of given knowledge (exploitation capabilities).  
2. Creation of new knowledge i.e., exploration or dynamic capabilities 
(Helfat, Finkelstein, & Mitchell, 2007).  
The question to ask is: Can the franchising network realize higher 
exploration and exploitation capabilities by using MUF compared to SUF? In 
other words, can MUF better circumvent the managerial constraints to system 
growth compared to SUF, owing to the Penrose effect of franchising 
(Thompson, 1994)?  
Exploitation capabilities refer to monitoring capabilities, knowledge 
transfer capabilities, and entrepreneurial capabilities. MUF results in higher 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising                       Chapter 3       MUF: Development of an Integrative Model 
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                                                                         55 
monitoring capabilities of the network compared to a system with single-unit 
franchisees, because the franchisor can decentralize some of the coordination 
tasks to the franchisees who are able to realize economies of monitoring and 
coordination in their mini-chains. This is compatible with Bradach’s (1997, p. 
285) view:  
‘‘The chain’s relatively wide spans of control over franchisees 
are attributable in part to the presence of franchisee-owned and 
operated mini-hierarchies, which exercised control over 
franchise units and enabled the chain to devote fewer resources 
to controlling the units.’’   
In addition, as multi-unit franchisees are more likely to replicate the 
organizational routines and procedures of the franchisor in their mini-chains 
compared to single-unit franchisees, the monitoring capabilities of the network 
increase owing to the similarity of performance measurement systems of 
multi-unit outlets and company-owned outlets of the franchisor (Bradach, 
1997). Furthermore, the knowledge transfer capability of the network is 
greater under MUF compared to SUF, because the franchisor can delegate 
some knowledge transfer tasks to the mini-chains. Moreover, MUF systems 
are characterized by higher human resources capabilities, owing to 
economies of training and recruiting of the mini-chains, compared to SUF 
systems (Weaven & Herington, 2007).  
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Exploration or dynamic capabilities primarily refer to the higher 
innovation and site-development capabilities of the networks (Bradach, 1995). 
MUF improves the capabilities of the system to grow and innovate. Especially, 
testing and evaluating new ideas in the mini-chains and implementing them in 
the entire system is more efficient under MUF compared to SUF. 
Furthermore, MUF networks have greater size development capabilities owing 
to the experience of multi-unit franchisees accumulated from previous outlet 
openings. Consequently, the higher exploration and exploitation capabilities of 
the MUF systems enable both the creation of more system-specific know-how 
and its more efficient exploitation (through higher knowledge transfer, 
monitoring, recruiting, and training capabilities) compared to SUF systems. 
The higher the system-specific know-how, owing to higher innovation 
capabilities of the MUF system, the more important are its greater monitoring, 
knowledge transfer, and human resource capabilities for the creation of 
residual surplus of the system. In sum, I can derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.6: System-specific assets are positively related to 
the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF. 
3.2.4 Property Rights Theory 
According to the property rights theory, the contractibility of assets determines 
the ownership structure of the firm (Hart, 1995; Hart & Moore, 1990; 
Windsperger & Dant, 2006). Contractibility of assets refers to the extent to 
which the franchisor’s and franchisee’s assets can be easily codified and 
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transferred to another partner. The impact of contractibility of assets on the 
choice of single-unit and multi-unit ownership strategy in franchising has not 
been examined in the literature. The lower the contractibility of local market 
assets, the more important is the outlet-specific knowledge of the local 
entrepreneur for the generation of residual income, and hence the stronger is 
the negative impact of local market assets on the tendency toward MUF. In 
addition, the contractibility of local market assets also influences the impact of 
financial resources on the ownership structure (Windsperger & Dant, 2006). 
The higher the contractibility of local market assets, the lower is the positive 
impact of financial resources on MUF, because the franchisor’s ability to 
acquire financial resources from the external capital market increases. 
Moreover, the lower the contractibility of the system-specific know-how, the 
more knowledge transfer capabilities are required to transfer the system-
specific know-how to the local outlets, and the greater is the effect of system-
specific assets on the tendency toward MUF. As a result, I can derive the 
following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3.7: The positive effect of system-specific know-how 
on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with non- 
contractibility of system-specific assets. 
Hypothesis 3.8: The negative effect of local market know-how 
on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with non-
contractibility of local market assets. 
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Hypothesis 3.9: The positive effect of financial assets scarcity on 
the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with non-
contractibility of local market assets. 
3.2.5 Screening Theory 
Based on screening theory (Dnes, 1992), transaction-specific investments 
have not only an ex-post bonding function, as argued in the transaction cost 
theory, but an ex-ante screening function as well. Owing to the heterogeneity 
of potential franchisees regarding their entrepreneurial capabilities, the 
franchisor uses higher transaction- investments of MUF as a screening device 
to attract franchisees with high entrepreneurial capabilities and a low 
propensity to act opportunistically.  The latter also results in less monitoring 
during the contract execution period (Huang & Cappelli, 2006). As mentioned 
earlier, multi-unit franchisees as area developers have to undertake higher 
transaction-specific investments than single-unit franchisees. Hence, 
franchisees choose area development MUF if they believe that they possess 
the desired entrepreneurial capabilities to generate a high residual surplus 
that more than compensates the higher investment costs. Consequently, in 
addition to the transaction cost hypothesis of transaction-specific investments, 
I can derive the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3.10: Franchisee’s transaction-specific investments 
as screening mechanism vary positively with the franchisor’s 
tendency toward MUF. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
 Castrogiovanni et al. (2006a) recently highlighted the growing importance of 
application of multi-theoretical reasoning to explain franchising as a 
governance form. The development of this model makes an important step in 
this direction. I develop a model that derives hypotheses from agency theory, 
transaction cost theory, resource-based and organizational capability views, 
property rights theory, and screening theory. According to this model, the 
residual income of the network can be increased by reducing transaction and 
agency costs and by increasing the organizational capabilities of the network, 
such as monitoring, knowledge transfer, human resource, innovation, and 
site-development capabilities. Therefore, MUF can better circumvent the 
managerial  constraints to system growth compared to SUF (Thompson, 
1994). In addition, higher relationship-specific investments of franchisee under 
MUF have higher bonding and screening effects than under SUF (Che & 
Hausch, 1999; Dnes, 1992; Williamson, 1983). Finally, the proposed 
integrative model should also help franchisors in focusing more sharply on the 
major drivers of ownership strategy that generate a higher residual income 
stream of the network. 
Parts of this integrative model are empirically tested in the next 
chapters.  Chapter four presents a comparative case analysis to empirically 
evaluate the hypotheses concerning agency theory, resource-based and 
organizational capabilities views, and transaction cost theory. A quantitative 
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analysis is employed in chapter five to test the hypotheses concerning 
organizational capabilities view and transaction cost theory. Whereas chapter 
six presents some empirical evidence on the franchisor’s use of MUF from a 
property rights view. 
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Chapter 4 
MUF: A Comparative Case Analysis1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The role of franchising in national economies is becoming more and more 
important (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996) by creating employment opportunities 
and service prevision (Spinelli et al., 2004). Franchising is the fastest growing 
form of retailing and a major portion of the recent growth can be attributed to 
the emergence of multi-unit franchising (Grünhagen & Dorsch, 2003; 
Kaufmann, 1993). Multi-unit franchising (MUF) refers to an organizational 
arrangement where one franchisee operates two or more franchised outlets in 
the same franchise system (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). On the other hand, 
single-unit franchising (SUF) refers to the traditional format where one 
franchisee operates only one franchised outlet.    
In the recent years, MUF has been examined from agency-theoretical , 
transaction cost and resource-scarcity perspectives. MUF can address a 
number of agency problems in a more effective way compared to SUF (Garg 
et al., 2005; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004; Vázquez, 
2008). Especially, multi-unit franchisees are better motivated to reduce the 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 4th International Conference on 
Economics and Management of Networks (EMNet) held at the University of Sarajevo (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) on September 03-05, 2009. The present version has been accepted for 
publication in the forthcoming issue (Vol. 27, No.1) of the Journal of Applied Business 
Research. 
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monitoring costs.  Geographical contiguity of franchised units positively 
influences the use of MUF (Gomez et al., 2010). The franchisors prefer MUF 
as compared to SUF to reduce the risk of free-riding at the local outlets. 
Bercovitz (2003) investigates MUF from a transaction cost perspective. She 
argues that MUF increases the franchisee’s quasi-rents based on higher 
outlet-specific investments and thereby increases the self-enforcing range of 
the franchise contract (Klein, 1995). If the self-enforcing range is higher under 
MUF compared to SUF, the opportunism risk is lower, and the franchisor less 
frequently uses disciplinary measures (litigation and termination) for contract 
enforcement. Consequently, MUF reduces the hold-up risk due to the stronger 
incentive effect compared to SUF. Furthermore, MUF-systems have a relative 
advantage over SUF-systems (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996) under the resource 
scarcity view.  The positive relationship between MUF and system growth has 
been evidenced in the previous research (Bradach, 1995; Kaufmann & Dant, 
1996; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995). Conversely, MUF-systems have lower local 
market capabilities compared to SUF-systems, due to SUF’s higher degree of 
local responsiveness (Bradach, 1995). Contrary to the predictions of resource 
scarcity theory, the use of MUF increases with size and maturity of the 
franchise system (Weaven & Frazer, 2007b; Weaven & Herington, 2007). 
MUF increases the organizational capabilities (such as monitoring, knowledge 
transfer, and innovation capabilities) and, consequently, strengthens the 
competitive position of the system. System uniformity, system wide 
adaptations, and system corporatization are examples of the organizational 
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capabilities (Bradach, 1995; Weaven & Frazer, 2007b; 2007a). Therefore, 
franchisors that focus on system uniformity, system corporatization, and 
system wide adaptations are more likely to use MUF.  
Although several empirical studies exist on MUF, transaction-specific 
investments (Klein, 1995; Williamson, 1983), system-specific assets, local 
market knowledge assets, and financial assets as determinants of the 
ownership strategy have not been investigated. Starting from this deficit, there 
is a need to apply multiple theoretical perspectives to explain this network 
form (Hussain & Windsperger, 2010). In this chapter, I develop a set of 
hypotheses by extending the existing literature in the following way: First, I  
apply the agency theory by investigating the influence of monitoring cost; 
second, I examine the bonding and scale efficiency effects of the higher 
transaction-specific investments from a transaction cost perspective; third, I 
examine hypotheses based on resource-based view.  
The chapter is organized in five sections. In section two, I develop a 
theoretical framework to explain the franchisor’s choice between single-unit 
and multi-unit franchising. The details of research methodology and the 
findings are presented in sections three and four. The last section includes 
discussion and conclusion. 
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4.2 Development of Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Monitoring Costs 
According to the agency theory (e.g., Brickley et al., 1991; Lafontaine, 1992), 
monitoring costs result from behavioral uncertainty, due to shirking of the 
network partners. The franchisor has two possibilities to reduce the agency 
costs: On the one hand, to reduce the residual loss by increasing the 
monitoring activities and, on the other hand, to increase the incentive by 
allocating a higher fraction of residual income to the franchisee. Higher 
motivation of the franchisees at the local outlets results in lower shirking under 
MUF compared to SUF. On the other hand, additional monitoring costs may 
arise, due to agency problems between franchisees and their outlet managers 
in the mini-chains. However, economies of monitoring and coordination of the 
mini-chains may mitigate this effect (Grünhagen & Mittelstaedt, 2002; Weaven 
& Frazer, 2003).  
Hypothesis 4.1: The franchisor’s expectation of higher 
monitoring costs results in a higher tendency toward multi-unit 
franchising.  
4.2.2 Franchisee’s Specific Investments 
Transaction-specific investments of the franchisee have the following effect on 
the governance structure:  If the franchisee is a multi-unit owner he has to 
undertake higher transaction-specific investments to open up the local 
network compared to SUF. On the other hand, the additional investment costs 
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are decreasing with the number of units in the mini-chain. This latter effect 
increases the franchisee’s dependency and hence his motivation to act 
cooperatively. In addition, franchisee’s investments also increase the 
franchisor’s dependency, if these investments have both a selfish and 
cooperative element (Che & Hausch, 1999). This bonding effect results from 
synergies between franchisee’s and franchisor’s investments that increase the 
self-enforcing range of franchise contracts (Klein, 1995).  
Furthermore, the cost of higher transaction-specific investment is 
mitigated by the franchisee’s expectation of higher residual income due to the 
scale efficiencies (Grünhagen & Mittelstaedt, 2002). Decreased marginal cost 
for opening additional outlets and increased franchisee’s economic rents due 
to economies of scale (for example, lower royalties, centralizing of purchase, 
etc.) and splitting operational costs (for example, monitoring and advertising 
expenses) result in higher motivation of the franchisee.    
Hypothesis 4.2:  The higher transaction-specific investments by 
the franchisee increase franchisor’s likelihood to use multi-unit 
franchising due to bonding effect and scale efficiencies. 
4.2.3 Franchisor’s System-specific Assets 
The franchisor's system-specific assets refer to brand name capital and the 
system-specific know-how (Hall, 1993; Klein & Leffler, 1981). MUF increases 
the organizational capabilities and hence the competitive position of the 
system by more efficiently deploying the system-specific assets. MUF results 
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in higher monitoring and knowledge transfer capabilities for the network 
compared to a system with SUF because the franchisor can delegate some 
tasks to the franchisee that has special market knowledge and realizes 
economies scale. These higher organizational capabilities enable the 
franchisor to more efficiently exploiting the system-specific assets.   
Hypothesis 4.3: The franchisor’s system-specific assets are 
positively related to the use of multi-unit franchising. 
4.2.4 Franchisee’s Local Market Assets 
According to the resource-scarcity view, the franchisor does not have enough 
local market knowledge at the beginning of the life-cycle of the franchise 
system (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968). Franchising 
enables him to overcome this scarcity problem. The question to ask is: Does 
MUF additionally mitigate this scarcity problem for the franchisor and hence 
contributes to explain the tendency toward franchising? Local market 
knowledge can be more efficiently acquired by single-unit franchisees 
compared to employees of the multi-unit network because the single-unit 
entrepreneur (as residual claimant) has higher entrepreneurial capabilities 
and is more motivated to exploit the profit opportunities at the local market 
environment than the multi-unit employee.  
Hypothesis 4.4: The franchisee’s local market knowledge assets 
are negatively related to the franchisor’s tendency toward multi-
unit franchising. 
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4.2.5 Financial Assets 
 Empirical studies show that MUF and system growth are positively related 
(Bradach, 1995; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995). MUF 
offers additional growth opportunities for the franchisor compared to the MUF 
strategy because multi-unit franchisees are often less constrained to finance 
the local outlets compared to the single-unit franchisees.  
Hypothesis 4.5: Higher financial resources scarcity at the 
franchisor’s end is positively related to franchisor’s tendency 
toward multi-unit franchising. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
The objective of this study is to link the theoretical predictions with the 
empirical patterns on MUF.  Case study methods are appropriate for the 
emerging research topics that have not been researched enough yet 
(Bradach, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Kaufmann 
& Dant, 1996; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995). I use a comparative case study 
method for this investigation as this research design provides multi-
dimensional evidence and allows the researchers to match theoretical with 
empirical patterns (Choo, 2005). Pattern matching is not always simple 
process of agreement or disagreement; the analysis may take new directions 
and also generate novel results (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Therefore, I argue 
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that the use of comparative case study method is an appropriate research 
design for this investigation. 
4.3.1 Case Selection 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors influencing franchisor’s 
choice between MUF and SUF. The investigation was designed as a 
comparative case study and an extensive desk research was conducted to 
purposely select two appropriate cases for this study from a population of 266 
franchise systems in Austria.  “A-COM” and “B-COM” (names changed for 
confidentiality reasons) were selected keeping in mind that they could provide 
me with some best insights about the phenomenon being investigated. As 
suggested by Yin (2008), case studies can generate rich qualitative data. The 
basic idea behind selection of these two franchise cases rests on the fact that 
the both systems are of the same age i.e., established in 1999, have multi-
national franchise networks, operating in the same business sector, and have 
comparable sizes. Additionally, both companies had a vast experience in 
roasting and selling coffee and subsequently decided to enter into gastronomy 
business. A-COM dominantly employs a MUF strategy and B-COM uses a 
SUF strategy. The comparison of these two franchise systems could provide a 
useful and in-depth view of the factors influencing franchisor’s choice between 
MUF and SUF strategies and enable me to make a valuable contribution to 
the literature by comparing the these factors with the theoretical predictions.  
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4.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The data were collected by interviews, documents, and online resources. The 
use of in-depth interviews has been endorsed by researchers in franchising 
(Kaufmann, 1996; Kaufmann & Dant, 1999). The previous MUF research 
lacks in theoretical foundations and well-defined constructs (Dant & Peterson, 
1990); therefore, I consider the use of in-depth interviews appropriate for this 
study. The documents included articles and information about the companies 
available on their own and third party websites. Multiple resources of data 
strengthen the positive points of qualitative data and contribute toward validity 
and reliability of the findings (Yin, 2008). Four in-depth personal interviews in 
June-July 2009 were conducted with the top executives primarily responsible 
for expansion and selection of franchising strategy. Some of the interviewees 
had very rich and diverse experience in franchising operations gathered while 
working at McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, Burger King, and finally at the franchise 
systems under study. The interviews were loosely structured and lasted for 
30-150 minutes. The questions focused on the general franchising strategy, 
the factors that influence franchisor’s choice between SUF and MUF, and 
finally some of the unanswered research questions were presented for 
comments and discussion.  One interview was conducted in English while 
remaining three were conducted in German and later translated into English. 
The respondents may be reluctant to provide sensitive information (Kaufmann 
& Dant, 1999) so anonymity and confidentiality were assured to increase their 
comfort level.  
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In the first step, I used the with-in case analysis approach (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) and developed detailed case study write-ups for each case. 
Despite of being descriptive in nature, these write-ups help in getting detailed 
insights (Gersick, 1988). Secondly, I coded the data in the light of hypothesis 
using Emergent Coding (Stemler, 2001) for the ease of analysis. Finally, I 
make a comparison of cross-case patterns and examine the model using 
these patterns.  
4.3.3 A-COM  
A-COM is a part of an Austrian family enterprise with its headquarters in 
Austria. The parent group brings along almost 60 years of experience in 
manufacturing high quality coffee making machines and roasting and selling 
coffee. They founded A-COM in 1999 and opened their first coffee shop in 
Vienna.  
“We tried this concept because we had the coffee machines, 
and the coffee and all other knowledge to build this up and then 
we wanted to see how it works. …People flooded our first shop 
and everybody wanted to know that how a “to go” concept 
works. … We changed the typical self-service coffee shop 
concept to a full-service concept to get a wider range of 
customers.” 
As of September 2009, A-COM had 196 units in 14 countries in four 
continents (see table 4.1 for details) and their network is continuously growing 
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in existing markets and penetrating into new ones. They had only 20 units in 
2004 and their network has grown up to 194 units in the last five years. A-
COM dominantly uses MUF (both sequential and area development) for its 
expansion.  
Table 4.1: A-COM Number of Outlets 
Sr. No. Country Outlets 
1 Germany 70 
2 USA 38 
3 Austria 34 
4 Hungary 10 
5 Poland 9 
6 Slovakia 9 
7 Russian 7 
8 Czech Republic 6 
9 Egypt 4 
10 Turkey 3 
11 Croatia 2 
12 Macedonia 2 
13 Bahrain 1 
14 Saudi Arabia 1 
 Total 196 
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4.3.4 B-COM 
The parent company of B-COM has been roasting “Vienna Coffee” for around 
100 years and the idea of B-COM was originated by a customer. 
“The parent company sells about 5 different kinds of coffee. We 
blend and roast them at our own and then sell them afterwards 
to gastronomy. This all begins with cheap breakfast coffee and 
goes further to high quality espresso. In mid 90s we were 
present at the exhibition “GAST” in Salzburg, Austria and Mr. 
Gerlicher, a guy from Germany, came to us and said ‘Wow, you 
have a great coffee, you should get more out of it’. …We tried 
this and the first, relatively small, store was opened in a 
shopping mall in 1999.”  
B-COM had 65 outlets in 10 countries as of September 2009. The 
company exclusively employs SUF strategy.  Table 4.2 appended on the next 
page presents the details of B-COM network. 
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Table 4.2: B-COM Number of Outlets 
Sr. No. Country Outlets 
1 Austria 38 
2 Germany 7 
3 Hungary 5 
4 Italy 4 
5 Turkey 4 
6 UAE 3 
7 Cypress 1 
8 Egypt 1 
9 UK 1 
10 Romania 1 
 Total 65 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Findings  
A-COM started with SUF and after sometime they realized that it could be 
difficult for them to have efficient control over the franchisees and also that 
they may not achieve the targeted growth rate, therefore, they shifted toward 
MUF as their expansion strategy. On the other hand, B-COM is sticking to 
their policy of SUF. In following sub-sections, I examine the factors that 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising                          Chapter 4              MUF: A Comparative Case Analysis 
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                                                                         74 
motivated these franchisors, with many similarities, to choose different 
franchising strategies. Table 4.3 shows a summary of the findings.  
 
Table 4.3: Summary of Findings 
 No. Variable 
Predicted 
Effect  
A-COM B-COM 
 
H4.1 
Franchisor’s Expectation of 
Monitoring Costs 
+  Supported  Supported  
 
H4.2 
Franchisee’s transaction-
specific investments 
+ Supported Supported 
 
H4.3 
Franchisor’s system-specific  
assets 
+ Supported 
Not 
Supported 
H4.4 
Local market knowledge 
assets 
- Supported Supported 
H4.5 
Franchisor’s financial 
resources scarcity 
+ Supported Supported 
 
 
 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising                          Chapter 4              MUF: A Comparative Case Analysis 
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                                                                         75 
4.4.1 Monitoring Costs (H4.1)  
A-COM considers monitoring costs as an important determinant of franchising 
strategy.  
“When the partner is far away, it doesn’t matter of the partner is 
in Tyrol or in Russia, then you try to build him up as an 
organization and you consult an organization. So you do visit the 
owner or the marketing boss or the operations guy there. You 
don’t have to visit 55 units and then talk to each of them. This 
reduces monitoring cost and you cannot do a day to day 
monitoring in Cairo. Monitoring cost is something that influences 
the decision on doing single-unit or multi-unit franchising.” 
On the other hand B-COM does not expect higher monitoring costs. 
Therefore, they do not realize any need to provide additional incentive to the 
franchisee by offering her/him additional units.  
“…We have the lowest agency problems. … A disadvantage for 
us is that the multi-unit franchisee has to pay lower royalties to 
B-COM. As far as monitoring costs are concerned, we have 
almost the same efforts, no matter whether we have single-unit 
or multi-unit arrangements.”     
The franchising strategies at both of the franchise systems are 
compatible with my monitoring cost hypothesis regarding the choice between 
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single and multi unit franchising strategies. Hence, the results support my 
hypothesis regarding the positive effect of monitoring costs on the use of 
MUF. 
4.4.2 Franchisee’s Specific Investments (H4.2)   
I predict a bi-dimensional effect of franchisee’s transaction-specific 
investments (i.e., bonding and economies of scale effect) on franchisor’s 
strategy. A-COM supports both effects of the transaction-specific investments.   
“Exactly, when we talk about multi-unit franchising, the initial 
investment is higher. … This has an influence on fees, because 
if you know that development is coming up, usually you 
negotiate fees. … Higher investments have a bonding effect 
because you cannot go out easily. You have your money there 
and nobody takes risk for money. You will try harder to be 
successful.” 
At B-COM, bonding effect of franchisee’s transaction-specific 
investments is not very strong. On the other hand, as far as economies of 
scale are concerned, at B-COM, the franchisees are obliged to buy all the 
products from the franchisor. There is a little room to achieve economies of 
scale by centralizing purchases at the mini-chain level.     
The findings are compatible with Hypothesis 4.2. 
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4.4.3 System-specific Assets (H4.3)  
This hypothesis predicts a positive effect of system-specific assets on the 
tendency toward MUF. A-COM uses MUF to help transfer its USP to the local 
outlet level.   
“Vienna has history, you know it’s romantic, it’s music, it’s 
theatre, Vienna has a coffeehouse tradition since 1684 after 2nd 
Turkish invasion, it’s something you can sell to people in every 
part of the world. So we took that part stronger into our concept. 
We are able to put two cultures together and create symbiotic 
approach to the customer that’s why we are there in Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and even America with Carnival Cruise 
Line Ships. …We have our own equipment, our own coffee 
machines, our own coffee, our own technology, and our own 
know-how; we have a different strategic approach than that in 
other companies.” 
B-COM considers system know-how very important for the success of 
their business. However, the franchising strategy at B-COM is not influenced 
by the specificity of the system assets.  
 In addition, A-COM claims to integrate culture with coffee and consider 
the “Viennese Coffee Culture” as an integral part of their system-specific 
assets that is difficult to transfer to local outlets.  
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“We transfer culture, history and a feeling, something that did 
not work for last 2000 years. … We have a handbook that 
includes the important knowledge to be transferred to the 
franchisee but the most of the knowledge transfer is done 
personally.”   
Furthermore, B-COM considers its system-specific assets as highly 
non-transferable; however, contrary to the predictions, they do not use multi-
unit franchising. The in-depth analysis of the detailed case write-up revealed 
that they are facing severe problems in transferring their system-specific 
know-how. Hence their ownership strategy might not be efficient, due to the 
importance of system-specific assets. 
 To conclude, the analysis of the A-COM data supports the hypothesis 
H4.3 that predicted positive effect of system-specific assets on the use of 
MUF. On the other hand, I found a misfit between theoretical and empirical 
patterns in the case of B-COM. 
4.4.4 Local Market Assets (H4.4) 
The main product (i.e., coffee) and local service of A-COM do not vary with 
local market characteristics. Hence the franchisee’s know-how is less 
responsible for the success of the system. The data from A-COM provide a 
weak support for this hypothesis. B-COM completely adapts to the local 
market. Although most of their raw material is supplied by the franchisor, the 
product line at the local outlets is adapted to the local requirements. 
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Therefore, the local market knowledge of the franchisee is very important. 
Hence the findings are compatible with Hypothesis 4.4. 
4.4.5 Financial Resources (H4.5) 
Financial resources scarcity is one of the major factors behind shifting from a 
single-unit to a multi-unit dominated strategy. A-COM started initially with 
SUF; however, they realized soon that system expansion is limited by the 
available financial resources.  A-COM strongly supports the hypothesis that 
franchisor’s financial resources scarcity leads to use a higher proportion of 
MUF. On the other hand, B-COM does not see any additional financial benefit 
from multi-unit franchisees. Hence I conclude that findings are compatible with 
Hypothesis 4.5. 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on explaining the franchisor’s use of MUF by using a 
comparative case analysis. I analyze the franchising strategies at A-COM and 
B-COM, two multinational franchise networks based in Austria. Franchisor’s 
expectation of higher monitoring costs leads them to use a higher proportion 
of multi-unit franchised outlets. The franchisors may realize economies of 
monitoring by delegating some monitoring tasks to the multi-unit owners. 
However, sometimes the franchisors (for example, B-COM) fear that very 
large franchisees will not be easy to control and they may create problems for 
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them in future, such franchisors tend to use higher proportion of SUF. The 
multi-unit franchisees have to undertake higher transaction-specific 
investments compared to single-unit franchisees. The franchisee’s 
transaction-specific investments have a dual effect on the franchising 
strategy. They increase the franchisees motivation to act cooperatively, due to 
the bonding effect and scale efficiencies. Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2002) 
also confirmed the scale efficiencies of multi-unit franchisees. The cost of 
higher transaction-specific investments can be mitigated by achieving scale 
efficiencies.  
The data from the interviews suggest that transferring the system-
specific assets to the local outlets is rather difficult because both A-COM and 
B-COM system-specific assets show a high degree of non-transferability. A-
COM’s low degree of transferability of system-specific assets is an important 
factor for using a higher proportion of MUF, particularly in the international 
markets. MUF helps A-COM transfer knowledge to their franchisees and 
ultimately results in successful transfer of the “Viennese coffee concept” to the 
local market outlets. Inconsistent with our prediction, B-COM applies a SUF 
strategy despite of having highly non-transferable system-specific assets. 
However, B-COM faces serious problems in transferring their system-specific 
know-how. Hence their ownership strategy might not be efficient.  The use of 
MUF increases the franchisor’s control by supporting the transfer of system-
specific assets to the local outlets and enabling the standardization of 
administrative procedures and routines at the local market.  
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On the other hand, the local adaptation capabilities under MUF are 
lower than under SUF. The findings also suggest a significant effect of local 
market knowledge on the choice of franchising strategy. However, single-unit 
franchisees may not always have an advantage compared to multi-unit 
franchisees with regard to local market adaptation. A-COM argues that there 
are no significant differences between the local market knowledge 
advantages of single-unit and multi-unit franchisees.  The reason behind this 
could be that the brand name of the A-COM is so important for the success of 
the system that local market adaptations do not generate additional residual 
income for the partners.  
Although the study provides a detailed insight of the ownership 
strategies of A-COM and B-COM by comparing theoretical predictions with 
empirical patterns regarding the choice of ownership strategy in franchising, 
the findings of this study are subject to the standard limitations of case study 
research methodology.  First, the major limitation of case study research is 
that the findings are rarely generalizable. Second, there is a lot data for 
analysis that sometimes leads to omission of some important information as it 
is difficult to use all the data at one time. 
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Chapter 5 
MUF: Organizational Capabilities and Transaction 
Cost Explanations1 
5.1 Introduction 
Franchising is an increasingly popular form of organization and its role in 
market economies is becoming more and more important. A major portion of 
recent growth in franchising business can be attributed to the emergence of 
multi-unit franchising (Dant et al., 2007; Grünhagen & Dorsch, 2003; 
Kaufmann, 1993). Multi-unit franchising (MUF) refers to an organizational 
arrangement where one franchisee owns two or more outlets at multiple 
geographical locations in the same franchise system.  This study applies the 
organizational capabilities (OC) view and transaction cost (TC) theory to 
explain franchisor’s use of MUF.  The organizational capabilities view argues 
that the firm can achieve competitive advantage by development and 
exploitation of firm-specific resources and capabilities (Helfat, Finkelstein, & 
Mitchell, 2007; Jacobides, 2006; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Hence, the 
OC perspective regards the firm as a bundle of resources which are 
transformed into organizational capabilities through interactive firm-specific 
processes to gain strategic rents (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Madhok, 1997; 
Rumelt, 1984). According the OC view, multi-unit franchising increases the 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is under review for presentation at an international research conference and for 
publication in a peer-reviewed international journal. 
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franchise’s firms organizational capabilities, especially the knowledge transfer 
and monitoring capabilities, and hence its competitive advantage compared to 
a single-unit franchising (SUF) system. Therefore, the ownership decision is 
primarily determined by the franchising firm’s ability to transfer its key 
resources (brand name and system-specific assets) to the local market. On 
the other hand, the transaction cost perspective regards the firm as an 
incentive and adaptation mechanism. It is primarily oriented toward the 
selection of an ownership strategy which minimizes transaction costs. 
According to the TC view multi-unit franchising reduces the franchisor’s 
opportunism risk due to the stronger bonding effect of transaction-specific 
investments compared to SUF. On the other hand, higher environmental 
uncertainty decreases the tendency toward MUF due to the lower local 
responsiveness of multi-unit franchisees. Hence MUF may result in higher 
search and information costs at the local market under high environmental 
uncertainty. 
Previous research primarily focuses on resource-scarcity and agency 
cost perspectives to explain MUF. According to the resource-scarcity view, 
the franchisors do not possess enough financial and managerial resources at 
the beginning of the franchise life-cycle (e.g., Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). 
Financial resources scarcity of the franchisor may result in higher tendency 
toward MUF to finance the expansion of the system. MUF offers additional 
growth opportunities for the franchisor compared to the SUF, because the 
multi-unit franchisees are less constrained in financing the local investments 
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compared to the single-unit franchisees. However, contrary to the predictions 
of resource scarcity theory, the use of MUF increases with size and maturity 
of the franchise system (Gomez, et al., 2010; Vázquez, 2008; Weaven & 
Frazer, 2007b; Weaven & Herington, 2007). This may be explained by the fact 
that size and maturity are indicators of greater organizational capabilities of 
the MUF-system (Baker & Dant, 2008; Bradach, 1995; 1998). In addition, 
Bradach (1995; 1998) and Weaven and Frazer (2007a; 2007b) examine the 
impact of system uniformity, system corporatization and system wide 
adaptations on the use of MUF. Although these researchers have not 
explicitly applied an OC-perspective, system uniformity, system wide 
adaptations, and system corporatization are examples of organizational 
capabilities. 
Agency cost explanations focus mainly on moral hazard and free-riding 
problems that can be mitigated by using MUF. The findings of these studies 
suggest that MUF can address number of agency problems in a more 
effective way compared to SUF (Bercovitz, 2004; Garg & Rasheed, 2003; 
Garg et al., 2005; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004; 
Vázquez, 2008; Weaven & Frazer, 2007a). Especially, multi-unit franchisees 
are better motivated to reduce the monitoring costs. The franchisors use MUF 
to shift the burden (in terms of monitoring) to the multi-unit franchisees (Jindal, 
2006). Geographical contiguity of franchised units is one of the important 
factors that play role in adoption of MUF. The franchise systems with a higher 
number of geographically contiguous units are more 
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proportion of MUF. When the franchisor has a strong brand name, there is a 
higher risk of free-riding by the single-unit franchisees. The franchisors prefer 
MUF as compared to SUF to reduce the risk of free-riding at the outlet level 
(Bercovitz, 2004; Brickely, 1999; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Vázquez, 2008). 
The use of MUF better aligns the goals of franchisee with those of franchisor 
which results in a reduced conflict in the franchise system (Zeller et al., 1980).  
Although several empirical studies were published on MUF in the last 
two decades, the research deficit primarily results from the lack of theoretical 
foundation of this ownership strategy (Hussain & Windsperger, 2010). The 
majority of previous studies on MUF derive hypotheses from an agency 
theoretical framework. Only Bercovitz (2003)  applies transaction cost 
reasoning to explain the use of MUF. However, she does not investigate the 
major transaction cost determinants of the ownership strategy, such as 
transaction-specific investments and uncertainty. Furthermore, there is no 
study that develops an organizational capabilities explanation for the 
franchisor’s use of MUF. Starting from this deficit, there is a need to apply 
transaction cost and organizational capabilities theory to explain this 
ownership strategy (Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a; 2006b).  Hence the 
objective of this study is to explain the multi-unit ownership strategy of the 
franchise firm by developing hypotheses based on the organizational 
capabilities and transaction cost perspectives.  
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My main contribution to the literature is first to complement the existing 
agency theoretical explanations by developing organizational capabilities and 
transaction cost explanations for the choice of multi-unit ownership strategy in 
franchising networks. While the TC- theory explains the use of MUF primarily 
in terms of minimization of transaction costs, the OC-theory takes the position 
that preserving and increasing a firm’s competitive advantage is the primary 
explanation for the positive relationship between firm-specific assets and 
capabilities and the use of multi-unit ownership strategy. Second, this study 
utilizes primary data from the German franchise systems that enables me to 
estimate the factors which the theory considers important to affect the choice 
of ownership strategy. We present the first empirical evidence that firm-
specific assets, such as brand name assets and system-specific know-how, 
and transaction-specific investments of the franchisee are positively related to 
the use of MUF and environmental uncertainty is negatively related to the use 
of MUF.  
The chapter is organized as follows: In section two, I develop the 
theory and the hypotheses. Section three explains the methodology, and 
sections four and five present and discuss the empirical results from the 
German franchise sector.  
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5.2  Theory and Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Organizational Capabilities View 
A firm’s resources bear the key importance in creating and maintaining 
competitive advantage and these resources include specific assets and 
capabilities available to the firm. According to the OC-view, ownership 
decisions are made under a calculus governed by considerations related to 
the exploration (development) and exploitation of a firm’s resources (Ekeledo 
& Sivakumar, 2004; Erramilli, Agarwal, & Dev, 2002; Helfat et al., 2007; 
Madhok, 1997; March, 1991). The question to ask is: Can the franchising 
network realize higher exploitation and exploration capabilities by using MUF 
compared to SUF? In other words, can MUF better circumvent the managerial 
constraints to system growth compared to SUF, due to the Penrose effect of 
franchising (Thompson, 1994)? 
Exploitation capabilities refer to monitoring capabilities, knowledge 
transfer capabilities, and human resource management capabilities. MUF 
results in higher monitoring capabilities of the network compared to a system 
with single-unit franchisees, because the franchisor can decentralize some of 
the coordination tasks to the franchisees who are able to realize economies of 
monitoring and coordination in their mini-chains. This is compatible with 
Bradach’s (1997) view.  In addition, since multi-unit franchisees are more 
likely to replicate the organizational routines and procedures of the franchisor 
in their mini-chains compared to single-unit franchisees, the monitoring 
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capabilities of the network may increase due to the similarity of performance 
measurement systems of multi-unit outlets and company-owned outlets of the 
franchisor (Bradach, 1997). Furthermore, MUF increases the knowledge 
transfer capability of the system because the franchisor can delegate some 
knowledge transfer tasks to the mini-chains. If the system-specific know-how 
of the franchisor is important for the success of the network, then it should be 
efficiently transferred to the other partner, i.e., the franchisee should be able 
to replicate it at the local markets (Erramilli et al., 2002). Moreover, MUF 
systems are characterized by higher human resources capabilities, due to 
economies of training and recruiting of the mini-chains, compared to SUF 
systems (Weaven & Herington, 2007). On the other hand, exploration or 
dynamic capabilities primarily refer to the higher innovation and site-
developing capabilities of the networks (Bradach, 1995). MUF improves the 
capabilities of the system to grow and innovate. Especially, testing and 
evaluating new ideas in the mini-chains and implementing them in the whole 
system is more efficient under MUF compared to SUF networks.  
Consequently, the greater organizational capabilities of the multi-unit 
system better enable both the creation of firm-specific assets (system-specific 
know how and brand name assets) and their more efficient deployment 
through transfer, monitoring, recruiting and training than under a SUF setting. 
The higher the system-specific know-how and brand name assets, the more 
important are its greater monitoring, knowledge transfer, and human resource 
capabilities for the creation of the system’s competitive advantage.  
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Brand Name Capital 
The franchisor's strategic assets refer to brand name capital and the system-
specific know-how (Hall, 1993; Klein & Leffler, 1981). The brand name capital 
results from investments in system marketing and promotion to achieve 
competitive advantage. The firm-specific assets are the source of sustainable 
competitive advantage for the franchising firm and need to be protected from 
misuse. Therefore, in order address this challenge, the franchisor are 
prompted to use an ownership strategy that supports the transfer and control 
of brand name. Hence, under a strong brand name capital, multi-unit 
ownership strategy enables the franchisor to exercise a higher degree of 
control than single-unit ownership strategy, due to its higher monitoring and 
human resources capabilities. MUF results in higher monitoring capabilities 
for the network compared to a system with SUF because the franchisor can 
delegate some monitoring tasks to the franchisee that has special market 
knowledge and realizes economies of monitoring. MUF improves the human 
resource capabilities due to more effective training at the mini-chains. These 
organizational capabilities enable a franchise system to maintain a 
sustainable increase in its brand name value.  
Hypothesis 5.1: Brand name capital is positively related to the 
franchisor’s tendency toward MUF. 
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Transferability of System-specific Know-how 
System-specific know-how includes knowledge and skills in site selection, 
store layout, product development, buying and merchandising (Kacker, 1988). 
System-specific assets result from capabilities of a franchise firm that drive 
the firm’s competitive advantage but are difficult to articulate and transfer to 
other units of the system. They refer to tacit know-how that is usually 
embedded in the firm’s employees and organizational routines (Madhok, 
1997). Successful franchising requires that the franchisor’s specific know-how 
be efficiently and effectively transferred to the outlet level. The task of 
transferring know-how becomes difficult if the assets are non-transferable or 
not easily codifiable.  MUF can help franchisors cope with the downstream 
knowledge transfer challenges in the network as they can delegate some 
know-how/knowledge transfer tasks to the multi-unit franchisees that can 
effectively further transfer system-specific know-how to the outlets in their 
mini-chains. In addition, the effectiveness of knowledge transfer increases as 
multi-unit franchisees are more likely to replicate the organizational routines 
and procedures of the franchisor in their mini-chains compared to single-unit 
franchisees (Bradach, 1995; Weaven & Frazer, 2007a). Therefore, the lower 
the transferability of system-specific know-how, the more knowledge transfer 
capabilities are necessary to efficiently transfer the system know-how to the 
local outlets, and the higher is the tendency toward MUF.  
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Hypothesis 5.2: The non-transferability of system-specific 
assets is positively related to the franchisor’s tendency toward 
MUF. 
5.2.2 Transaction Cost Theory  
While the OC-theory takes the position that gaining strategic rents and hence 
increasing a firm’s competitive advantage is the primary explanation for the 
positive relationship between firm-specific assets (brand name capital and 
system-specific know-how) and the use of multi-unit ownership strategy, TC-
theory explains the use of MUF primarily in terms of minimization of 
transaction costs. Therefore, the main difference between TC-theory and OC-
theory is that TC focuses primarily on the impact of governance form on 
transaction costs, due to bounded rationality and opportunism, and the OC-
theory addresses the impact of governance form on the rent-generating 
potential of firm-specific resources and capabilities. According to Williamson 
(1975; 1983; 1985), transaction-specific investments and uncertainty are the 
major determinants of ownership mode decision.  
Transaction-specific Investments 
 Transaction-specific investments (as selfish investments) of the franchisee 
have the following effect on the governance structure:  If the franchisee is a 
multi-unit owner, he has to undertake higher transaction-specific investments 
to open up the local network compared to SUF. On the other hand, the 
additional investment costs are decreasing with the number of units in the 
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mini-chain. This bonding effect increases the franchisee’s dependency and 
hence his motivation to act cooperatively. In addition, franchisee’s transaction-
specific investments also increase the franchisor’s dependency, if these 
investments have both a selfish and cooperative element (Che & Hausch, 
1999). The cooperative effect results from synergies between franchisee’s 
and franchisor’s transaction-specific investments that increase the self-
enforcing range of franchise contracts (Klein, 1995). Consequently, I can 
derive the following proposition: The higher the bonding effect of the 
franchisee’s transaction-specific investments under MUF compared to SUF, 
the higher is the tendency toward MUF. 
Hypothesis 5.3: Franchisee’s transaction-specific investments 
are positively related to the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF. 
Environmental Uncertainty 
 Although Williamson (1975) extensively discussed the role of 
uncertainty/complexity for the choice of organizational form, few studies 
investigate the influence of this factor on the choice of governance 
mechanism (Anderson, 1985; Klein et al., 1990; Noordewier et al., 1990; 
Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Based on Simon’s (1947) information processing 
view of organization, higher environmental uncertainty requires more local 
information processing capacity by delegating coordination tasks to the local 
entrepreneurs (Prendergast, 2002). Applied to franchising, the higher the 
environmental uncertainty at the local market, the more local entrepreneurial 
capabilities are required to acquire and process the relevant local market 
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knowledge (Campbell et al., 2009), and the lower is the tendency toward 
MUF. 
Hypothesis 5.4: Environmental uncertainty is negatively related 
to the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF. 
Figure 5.1 appended below summarizes the proposed model.  
Figure 5.1: Theoretical Model – I  
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5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Data Collection 
Empirical data to test the hypotheses were collected from the German 
franchise sector. The directory of the German Franchise Federation (DFV) and 
“Franchise Wirtschaft” (a Bond’s Franchise Guide type directory published in 
Germany) list all franchise systems operating in the country. Some 
demographic data (i.e., year system was established, number of outlets, 
business sector, etc.) are also listed against each system in the Franchise 
Wirtschaft. These directories list 837 franchise systems operating in Germany 
and served as the sampling frame for this study. The judgmental sampling 
was employed and the sample was drawn on the basis of the following two-
point criterion. 
1. The system should have at least five outlets in Germany 
2. If the data about the outlets is not listed in the directory, the system 
should have started franchising in Germany before year 2008. 
These sampling criteria enabled us to filter the franchisors so that we 
could contact only those who were relevant for the study. I do not regard very 
small franchisors (having below 5 outlets) or very new systems (below the age 
of 2 years) relevant for this study on MUF. The final sample consisted of 491 
franchise systems. 
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  The data were collected via self-administered questionnaire which was 
developed in several steps. After several preliminary refinements, we 
conducted in-depth interviews with franchise professionals from the Austrian 
and German franchise associations and a pre-test with 20 franchisors in 
Austria. The respondents are selected on their expertise and relevance to the 
subject under investigation.  Therefore, we use the key informant (McKendall 
& Wagner III, 1997) approach for data collection. Accordingly, the informants 
for this study were senior managers who are mainly responsible for the 
franchise expansion. The information about the key informants was retrieved 
from the Franchise Wirtschaft. The personally addressed questionnaires were 
mailed to the key informants of all 491 relevant franchise systems in 
Germany. We received back 137 filled questionnaires with a response rate of 
28%. However, due to missing value, only all responses could not be used for 
the regression analysis. 
To check for the non-response bias, I use two methods. First, non-
response bias was estimated by comparing early versus late respondents 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977), where late respondents serve as proxies for 
non-respondents. Second, the respondents were compared to non-
respondents in terms of age, size, advertising fee, and royalties to determine 
whether non-response was a serious problem for the data. These variables 
are available in the Franchise Wirtschaft for the entire listed systems. I used 
these data to run independent sample t-test in order to check whether the 
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sample is representative. I found no significant difference between the 
respondents and the non-respondents (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Estimate of Non-Response Bias2 - I  
 Means, (SD), and Counts3  
 Population  Respondents  t-value  p-value  
Age of  Franchise System  
(Years) 
 
10.102 
(8.122) 
N = 449 
11.190 
(8.391) 
N = 121 
-1.298 0.195 
System Size (total outlets) 
 
112.718 
(431.444) 
N = 337 
155.949 
(328.376) 
N = 118 
0.992 0.322 
Advertising Fee (% of Sales) 1.002 
(1.497) 
N = 326 
0.930 
(1.342) 
N=127 
-0.478 0.633 
Royalties (% of Sales) 4.473 
(6.282) 
N = 446 
5.442 
(7.452) 
N = 117 
1.408 0.16 
 
                                                 
2
 The measures of, Initial Franchise Fee, Advertising Fee, and Royalties were first tested by a 
MANOVA to ensure independence of these variables.  
 
3
 Counts differ across different measures because of item non-response.  
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5.3.2 Measurement 
The measures of the relevant variables are summarized in the Appendix 5.1. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, proportion of multi-unit outlets (PropMUF), is 
measured as a ratio of franchised outlet to the number of franchisees. A 
similar ratio has been used in previous studies (Bercovitz, 2003; Gomez et al., 
2010; Weaven & Frazer, 2004) as an indicator for MUF.  However, some 
studies use dichotomous measures for the use of MUF (Bradach, 1995; 
Grünhagen & Mittelstaedt, 2005; Lopez-Bayon & Lopez-Fernandez, 2008; 
Robicheaux et al., 1994) .   
Independent Variables 
Non-transferability of system-specific know-how (TRF): Franchisor’s 
know-how refers to system-specific intangible assets. This know-how is 
transferred to the other franchise partners (i.e., franchisees) to replicate it in 
the local market to achieve the targeted goals. In this study, the franchisors 
were asked to rate the transferability of their system-specific assets. I argue 
that the lower transferability requires a higher level of franchisor’s know-how 
transfer capabilities. A seven-item Likert-type scale is employed to measure 
non-transferability of system-specific know-how (see Appendix 5.1 for detail of 
the items employed).   
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Brand name capital (BRAND):  A four-item Likert-type scale is used 
to measure the franchisor’s brand name capital, Franchisors were asked to 
rate their systems on brand strength compared to competitors, brand 
recognition compared to competitors, reputation for quality, and importance of 
brand name for achieving competitive advantage. The items have been 
adapted from Combs and Ketchen (2004) and Barthélemy (2008).   
Franchisee’s transaction-specific investments (INV):  They refer to 
the total amount (in thousand €) required to start up a new franchised outlet. 
Initial investments (excluding initial fees) are an indicator for franchisees’ 
transaction-specific investments which function as a bonding device.  
Environmental uncertainty (ENV):  Based on measures used by 
Celly & Frazier (1996) and John & Weitz (1988), this construct has been 
measured using a three-item liker-type scale. The franchisors were asked to 
provide their perception regarding fluctuation in the outlet level sales, 
unpredictability of the market, and volatility of local economic situation. The 
fourth item regarding the accuracy of sales forecasts was dropped due to low 
item-total correlation and scale reliability concerns.  
Control Variables  
System size (SIZE): The size of the system is measured by the total of 
franchised and company-owned outlets. The larger franchise systems signal a 
higher level of strength and success of the system and are more attractive for 
the prospect multi-unit franchisees. The existing research also suggests a 
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positive effect of system size on its use of MUF (Gomez et al., 2010; 
Vázquez, 2008; Weaven & Frazer, 2007b; Weaven & Herington, 2007).  
  Sector (SECT): 1 refers to services franchising and 0 to product 
franchising. Previous studies (e.g., Wadsworth & Morgan, 2003) suggest that 
MUF varies with the industry and the business sector. Since services 
franchising firms are characterized by more intangible assets compared to 
product franchising firms, they require more local knowledge transfer and 
monitoring capabilities. Hence services firms may have a higher tendency 
toward MUF. 
Age (AGE): Due to the signalling effect of the established reputation 
and brand name, experienced franchisors are more likely to attract multi-unit 
franchisees compared to franchise systems in the early stages of the 
organizational life cycle. The existing research shows that the age of system 
may have a positive impact on the use of MUF (Weaven, 2009; Weaven & 
Frazer, 2007b; Weaven & Herington, 2007). AGE is measured by the number 
of years since the firm started franchising in Germany. 
5.3.3 Construct Validity and Reliability 
During the process of instrument development, the content validity was 
ensured by extensive literature review. Franchising professionals provided a 
very valuable feedback to improve the questionnaire. As mentioned earlier, 
franchisors and officials from the franchise associations were actively involved 
in the pre-test phase. Some items were dropped from the initial version of the 
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questionnaire due to possible ambiguity as suggested by the pre-test. As 
detailed in the earlier sub-section, I use multi-item scales for measuring 
transferability of system-specific assets, brand name capital, and 
environmental uncertainty.  
I also conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS 17.0 
to check the validity and goodness of fit of the factors measuring underlying 
latent constructs. Figure 5.2 (appended on the next page) presents the results 
for confirmatory factor analysis.  One item from each of transferability and 
environmental uncertainty was deleted due to low item-total correlations and 
low factor loadings. In consistency with theoretical constructs, the factor 
analysis produced a clear three-factor solution with good CFA fitness 
(χ2=135.416, df=74, p=0.000, RMSEA=0.078, CFI=0.939). I also employed 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett tests (KMO=0.835, χ2=900.278, df=91, 
p=0.000) to detect outliers and to establish normality and sampling adequacy 
of the data. Cronbach’s Alpha has also been calculated to test the scale 
reliability and the analysis of the constructs reported all three factors having 
values well above the recommended cut-off value of 0.70 (Cronbach, 1951; 
Nunnally, Bernstein, & Berge, 1994).  
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Figure 5.2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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I use OLS regression analysis to test the proposed model (see figure 
5.1). The dependent variable “proportion of multi-unit franchising” (PropMUF) 
is modeled as number of units per franchisee. Brand name capital (BRAND), 
non-transferability of franchisor’s system-specific know-how (TRF), 
franchisee’s transaction-specific investments (INV), and environmental 
uncertainty (ENV) are used as predictor variables. System size measured by 
the total number of outlets (SIZE), sector (SECT), and age of the system 
(AGE) are also included in the model as control variables. Hence, we estimate 
the following regression equation:  
PropMUF = α0 + α1BRAND + α2TRF + α3INV + α4ENV + α5SIZE + 
α6SECT + α7AGE + ε 
According to the organizational capabilities view, I propose positive 
effects of brand name capital (BRAND) and non-transferability of franchisor’s 
specific know-how (TRF) of the franchisor’s use of MUF. Based on transaction 
cost theory, I hypothesize a negative effect of environmental uncertainty 
(ENV) and a positive effect of franchisee’s transaction-specific investments 
(INV) on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.  
All four Hypotheses (5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4) proposed in this paper are 
supported by the analysis of the empirical data. Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 
present results of the regression analysis. 
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Table 5.3: OLS Regression – OC   
     Model 1    Model 2  
Variable 
Constant     1.473***   1.410*** 
     (0.090)   (0.151) 
 
TRF     0.253***   0.257*** 
     (0.090)   (0.090) 
 
BRAND    0.194**   0.172* 
     (0.090)   (0.096) 
 
SIZE      ----    0.028  
         (0.104) 
 
SECT     ----    0.080 
         (0.190) 
 
AGE     ----    0.239** 
         (0.103) 
 
Model Summary  
N┼     115    111 
Model F    6.605***   4.462*** 
R2     0.105    0.174 
Adjusted R2    0.089     0.135 
Dependent Variable = PropMUF 
Values in parentheses represent Standard Errors 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;  *p < 0.1 
┼
 Counts across models differ due to item non-response 
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Table 5.4: OLS Regression – TC  
     Model 3    Model 4  
Variable 
Constant     1.489***   1.578*** 
     (0.080)   (0.133) 
 
INV     0.333***   0.304*** 
     (0.079)   (0.079) 
 
ENV     -0.251***   -0.265*** 
     (0.080)   (0.080) 
 
SIZE      ----     -0.013  
         (0.088) 
 
SECT     ----    -0.121 
         (0.167) 
 
AGE     ----    0.256*** 
         (0.090) 
 
Model Summary  
N┼     108    106 
Model F    16.515***   8.983*** 
R2     0.238    0.308 
Adjusted R2    0.223     0.274 
Dependent Variable = PropMUF 
Values in parentheses represent Standard Errors 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;  *p < 0.1 
┼
 Counts across models differ due to item non-response 
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Table 5.5: OLS Regression – OC & TC  
     Model 5    Model 6  
Variable 
Constant     1.439***   1.499*** 
     (0.073)   (0.122) 
 
TRF     0.323***   0.304*** 
     (0.073)   (0.073) 
 
BRAND    0.205***   0.220*** 
     (0.075)   (0.079) 
 
INV     0.352***   0.332*** 
     (0.072)   (0.072) 
 
ENV     -0.217***   -0.240*** 
     (0.073)   (0.073) 
 
SIZE      ----    0.071  
         (0.082) 
 
SECT     ----    -0.097 
         (0.151) 
 
AGE     ----    0.154* 
         (0.084) 
 
Model Summary  
N┼     106    104 
Model F    17.933***   11.916*** 
R2     0.413    0.462 
Adjusted R2    0.390     0.424 
Dependent Variable = PropMUF 
Values in parentheses represent Standard Errors 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;  *p < 0.1 
 
┼
 Counts across models differ due to item non-response 
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5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop and test organizational capabilities and transaction 
cost explanations for the franchisor’s use of MUF in the German franchise 
sector. The empirical data support all four hypotheses proposed in this study.   
While the OC-theory takes the position that increasing a firm’s 
competitive advantage is the primary explanation for the positive relationship 
between firm-specific assets and capabilities and the use of multi-unit 
ownership strategy, the TC- theory explains the use of MUF primarily in terms 
of minimization of transaction costs. According to the organizational 
capabilities view, the franchisors are more likely to use a higher proportion of 
MUF if the system has highly firm-specific assets, such as brand name and 
system-specific know-how that generate competitive advantage. High brand 
name and system-specific assets require higher monitoring and knowledge 
transfer capabilities to efficiently exploit the rent-generating potential of these 
assets. The multi-unit franchisees are larger partners and possess higher 
monitoring and human resources capabilities to implement franchisor’s 
specific know-how in the local market. Additionally, franchisors can delegate 
some of the knowledge transfer tasks to the mini-chain owners that ultimately 
results in system’s higher know-how transfer capabilities. Therefore, under a 
strong brand name and high system-specific assets, multi-unit ownership 
strategy enables the franchisor to exercise a higher degree of control than 
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single-unit ownership strategy, due to its higher monitoring and knowledge 
transfer capabilities.  
According to the TC theory, transaction-specific investments and 
environmental uncertainty determine the ownership mode decision. First, the 
amount of franchisee’s investments required for opening up a new outlet has 
a positive influence on the use of MUF. The higher required investments tend 
to enhance franchisor’s likelihood to use MUF due to the stronger bonding 
effect. Multi-unit franchisees have higher motivations to behave cooperatively 
as they have a higher stake involved (compared to single-unit franchisees) in 
the franchise relationship. Second, environmental uncertainty is an important 
determinant of the governance mode (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). High 
uncertainty in the local market environment has a negative impact on the 
franchisor’s use of MUF. In a highly uncertain environment, more local 
responsiveness is required to adapt to environmental changes. The single-
unit franchisees are better able to respond more quickly to any environmental 
changes as compared to larger multi-unit franchisees. Therefore, the results 
suggest that franchisors are likely to prefer SUF over MUF in the case of 
highly uncertain local market environment. Additionally, I also found a positive 
relationship between age and the franchisor’s use of MUF. This result is 
consistent with the previous studies conducted in this context (Weaven, 2009; 
Weaven & Frazer, 2007b; Weaven & Herington, 2007). Older franchise 
systems generally signal higher brand reputation and hence are more 
attractive for the multi-unit franchisees.  
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What is my contribution to the franchise literature? The main 
contribution of this study is to present complementary perspectives to the 
agency-theoretical explanations by developing organizational capabilities and 
transaction cost explanations for the choice of multi-unit ownership strategy in 
the franchising networks. The OC-theory suggests that a franchising firm’s 
specific assets and capabilities positively influence its use of MUF because 
this organizational form increases franchising firm’s competitive advantage. 
The organizational capabilities view explains MUF as a governance mode that 
enables the development and deployment of firm-specific assets to gain 
strategic rents. The multi-unit franchise systems’ higher monitoring and 
knowledge transfer capabilities result in higher residual income compared to 
single-unit franchise systems, especially when the system-specific know-how 
is non-transferable and the brand name assets have a high rent-generating 
potential. On the other hand, the transaction cost perspective regards the firm 
as an incentive and adaptation mechanism to minimize transaction costs. 
According to the transaction cost theory, transaction-specific investments 
have a positive and environmental uncertainty a negative impact on the use of 
multi-unit ownership strategy. Furthermore, this study utilizes primary data 
from the German franchise systems that enables me to estimate the factors 
which the theory considers important to affect the choice of ownership 
strategy. I present the first empirical evidence that firm-specific assets, such 
as brand name assets and system-specific know-how, and transaction-
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specific investments of the franchisee are positively related to the use of MUF 
and environmental uncertainty is negatively related to the use of MUF.  
This study also bears important managerial implications for the 
franchisor’s choice of ownership strategy. Since a MUF-system have has 
higher knowledge transfer and monitoring capabilities compared to a SUF-
system, it enables the franchisor to better develop and exploit its brand name 
capital and system-specific know-how. Hence if the brand name and the 
system-specific know-how are very important for the success of the franchise 
system, a higher proportion of MUF increases the rent-generating potential of 
the franchise network. Second, on the other hand, in the case of a highly 
uncertain environment, the franchisor should consider using a higher 
proportion of SUF as the single-unit franchisees possess higher 
entrepreneurial capabilities and they can cope with the local market changes 
in a more effective manner compared to the local mini-chains. Third, the 
franchisor can reduce the ex-post transaction costs due to the stronger 
bonding effect of higher transaction-specific investments under multi-unit 
contracts.  
 Despite having presented a set of new explanations for the franchisor’s 
use of MUF, this study has some limitations. First, I could not use all the 
responses for regression analysis due to the missing values. This might have 
resulted in a significant loss of information. Second, although, based on an 
extensive review of the relevant literature, I attempt to use the most 
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appropriate measures for the latent constructs; some may raise questions 
about the measurement issue.  
 The future research may be directed to find alternative theoretical 
explanations for the franchisor’s use of various ownership strategies within the 
franchising setting. Additionally, it would also be a very important research 
question to investigate the franchisor’s simultaneous decision problem about 
the choice between the proportion of company-ownership and multi-unit 
franchising. MUF increases the franchisee’s control over the local markets 
which can be at least partly compensated by a higher proportion of company-
owned outlets. 
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Chapter 6 
MUF: A Property Rights View1 
6.1 Introduction 
The expansion of franchising networks by opening up franchised outlets can 
be based on two ownership strategies: single-unit franchising (SUF) and 
multi-unit franchising (MUF). Under SUF a franchisee operates only one outlet 
while in the case of MUF arrangement a franchisee operates two or more 
outlets at multiple geographical locations in the same franchise system. The 
phenomenon of MUF can be further divided into two types, i.e., area 
development multi-unit strategy and sequential multi-unit strategy (Kaufmann, 
1993; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). In the first case, the franchisee has the right 
to open a certain number of outlets in a particular geographical area during a 
specified time period, and in the second case, the existing franchisee is 
granted the right to sequentially open up additional outlets (Grünhagen & 
Mittelstaedt, 2005). The present study focuses on a property rights 
explanation of the multi-unit ownership strategy in franchising networks by 
emphasizing the role of non-contractible (intangible) assets as determinant of 
ownership structure.  
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 24th Annual International Society of 
Franchising (ISoF) Conference held at the University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia) 
on June 07-09, 2010. The present version is under review for publication in a peer-reviewed 
international journal. 
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Although several theoretical and empirical studies dealing with MUF 
have been published in recent years, no study tests a property rights 
approach to explain MUF. MUF has been examined from agency cost, 
transaction costs and resource-based perspectives. First, MUF can address a 
number of agency problems in a more effective way compared to SUF 
(Bercovitz, 2004; Brickely, 1999; Garg & Rasheed, 2003; Garg et al., 2005; 
Jindal, 2006; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004; Weaven & 
Frazer, 2007a). Especially, multi-unit franchisees are better motivated to 
reduce monitoring costs. Geographical contiguity of franchised units positively 
influences the use of MUF (Gomez et al., 2010). The franchisors prefer MUF 
compared to SUF to reduce the risk of free-riding at the local outlets 
(Bercovitz, 2004; Brickely, 1999; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004). Fladmoe-
Lindquist and Jacque (1995) argue that multi-unit franchisees provide better 
quality of goods/services than single-unit franchisees because shirking on 
quality would affect the multi-unit franchisee’s business in the local network 
and ultimately his profitability.  
Second, Bercovitz (2003) applies transaction cost reasoning to explain 
MUF. She argues that MUF increases the franchisee‘s quasi-rents based on 
higher outlet-specific investments and thereby increases the self-enforcing 
range of the franchise contract (Klein, 1995). If the self-enforcing range is 
higher under MUF compared to SUF, the opportunism risk is lower, and the 
franchisor less frequently uses disciplinary measures (litigation and 
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termination) for contract enforcement. Consequently, MUF reduces the hold-
up risk, due to the stronger incentive effect compared to SUF.  
Third, under the resource scarcity view, MUF systems have a relative 
advantage over SUF systems (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996).  Empirical studies 
show that MUF and system growth are positively related (Bradach, 1995; 
Gomez et al., 2010; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995; 
Vázquez, 2008). Kaufmann & Kim (1995) also argue that franchise systems 
with higher growth rate are in a better position to attract high-quality partners 
as multi-unit franchisees. In addition, MUF increases the organizational 
capabilities and, consequently, strengthens the competitive position of the 
system. Examples of organizational capabilities are system uniformity, 
system-wide adaptations and system corporatization (Bradach, 1995; 1998; 
Weaven & Frazer, 2007a; 2007b).  
Starting from the existing literature that primarily focuses on agency 
cost, transaction cost, and resource scarcity perspectives to explain the multi-
unit ownership strategy, I extend the literature by developing a property rights 
explanation of the multi-unit ownership strategy of the franchise firm. 
According to the property rights theory, the allocation of ownership rights 
between the franchisor and the single-unit and multi-unit franchisees depends 
on the contractibility of assets, i.e., system-specific assets, local market 
assets and financial assets. First, I hypothesize that MUF is negatively related 
to the franchisee’s intangible local market assets and positively with the 
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franchisor’s intangible system-specific assets. Second, I argue that the impact 
of financial assets on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with 
non-contractibility of local market assets.  
What does the property rights approach contribute to the existing 
literature, and what answers do the property rights perspective provide that 
other perspectives cannot? When setting up a franchising network the 
franchisor has to assign residual income and ownership rights between the 
network partners. Hence designing MUF vs. SUF contracts is a question of 
allocating residual income rights and ownership rights between the network 
partners. Compared to the agency theory that explains the allocation of 
residual income by incentive contracts between the franchisor and single-unit 
and multi-unit franchisees, property rights theory explains the allocation of 
ownership rights between the franchisor and franchisees. Agency theory 
cannot distinguish between performance incentives and ownership incentives 
because it implicitly assumes that “a contract that provides full incentives to 
an individual is fundamentally the same as selling the firm to this individual” 
(Hubbard, 2008, p. 349). Therefore, in a strictly methodological sense, agency 
theory cannot explain the allocation of ownership rights as residual rights of 
control, due to the complete contracting assumption (Hart, 1995; 2003). 
Compared to the transaction cost theory that focuses on transaction-specific 
assets as determinant of the ownership structure without differentiating 
between contractible and non-contractible specific assets (Bakos & 
Brynjolfsson, 1993; Whinston, 2003), property rights theory explains the 
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choice of ownership structure (SUF, MUF) by focusing on non-contractible 
assets. Similarly, the resource scarcity view, which focuses on the franchisor’s 
resource advantages (information, managerial and financial advantages) by 
using franchised outlets, does not differentiates between contractible and non-
contractible resources either (Windsperger & Dant, 2006).  
To summarize, compared to the agency theory that provides an 
explanation of performance incentives by allocating residual income rights 
without explaining the ownership structure, property rights theory provides an 
explanation of the structure of ownership rights. In addition to the transaction 
cost and resource scarcity perspectives property rights theory focuses on the 
impact of contractibility of assets/resources on the structure of ownership 
pattern. Only non-contractible assets influence the structure of ownership 
rights (Baker & Hubbard, 2004; Hart, 1995). 
The chapter is organized as follows: In section two, I develop the 
theory and the hypotheses. Sections three explains the methodology and 
sections four and five present and discuss the empirical results from the 
German franchise sector.  
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6.2  A Property Rights View on Multi-unit Ownership 
Strategy  
6.2.1 Intangible Assets as Determinant of the Allocation of 
Ownership Rights 
According to the property rights theory, the asset characteristic relevant for 
the allocation of ownership rights is the degree of intangibility (Brynjolfsson, 
1994; Hart & Moore, 1990). Intangible assets refer to knowledge and skills 
that cannot be codified and easily transferred to other agents since they have 
an important tacit component (Nelson & Winter, 1982). What are the 
intangible assets in franchising? The franchisee’s intangible assets refer to 
the local market know-how in local advertising and customer service, quality 
control, human resource management and product innovation (Wicking, 
1995). The franchisor’s intangible assets refer to the system-specific know-
how and brand name capital (Hall, 1993; Klein & Leffler, 1981). The system-
specific know-how includes knowledge and skills in site selection, store 
layout, product development, buying and merchandising (Kacker, 1988). The 
brand name assets refer to intangible investments in system marketing and 
promotion. 
How are the ownership rights allocated between the franchisor and the 
franchisee? According to the property rights theory, contractibility of assets 
determines the ownership structure of the firm (Hart, 1995; Hart & Moore, 
1990). Contractibility of assets refers to the extent to which the franchisor’s 
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system-specific assets and franchisee’s local market assets can be easily 
codified and transferred to the other partner.  The impact of contractibility of 
assets on the choice of single-unit and multi-unit ownership strategy in 
franchising has not between examined in the literature. In this study, I develop 
the following property rights hypotheses (see figure 6.1):  
(1) The lower the contractibility of local market assets, the more important 
is the local responsiveness and outlet-specific knowledge of the local 
entrepreneur for the generation of residual income, and the lower is the 
tendency to use MUF compared to SUF.  
(2) The lower the contractibility of local market assets, the larger is the 
positive impact of financial resources on the tendency toward using 
MUF because the franchisor is less able to acquire the financial 
resources at the external capital market.  
(3) The lower the contractibility of the system-specific assets, the more 
knowledge transfer capabilities are required to transfer the system 
know-how to the local outlets, and the greater is the positive effect of 
system-specific assets on the tendency toward MUF. Figure 6.1 
appended on the next page presents an overview of the theoretical 
model.  In the following section, the hypotheses are developed in 
detail.  
 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising                           Chapter 6                        MUF: A Property Rights View   
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                                                                         120 
Figure 6.1: Theoretical Model – II 
 
6.2.2 Hypotheses 
Contractibility and Local Market Assets 
 Local market knowledge can be more efficiently acquired by single-unit 
franchisees compared to the employees of multi-unit networks because 
single-unit franchisees (as residual claimants) have higher entrepreneurial 
capabilities (Bradach, 1995; 1997) and are more motivated to exploit the profit 
opportunities at the local market than the multi-unit franchisee’s employees. 
Franchisee’s intangible assets refer to the franchisee’s local market know-how 
consisting of ‘exploration’ assets and ‘exploitation’ (or managerial) assets 
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(Sorenson & Sørensen, 2001). The former include local market knowledge 
and innovation capabilities, and the latter include quality control, human 
resource management and administrative capabilities. The lower the 
contractibility of local market assets, the more important is the outlet-specific 
knowledge of the local entrepreneur for the generation of residual income, 
and the lower is the tendency toward MUF. I derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6.1:  Franchisees’ non-contractible local market 
assets are negatively related to the franchisor’s tendency to use 
multi-unit franchising.  
Contractibility and Financial Resources Advantage 
Financial resource scarcity of the franchisor is a major reason to use 
franchising for financing the growth of the system. First, the question to ask is 
under which conditions the franchisor may realize an advantage by using the 
franchisee’s financial resources. The reason lies in the low contractibility of 
assets, especially in the early phase of the organizational life cycle. The 
franchisor may be quite constrained by the information asymmetry between 
the external lender and him/her concerning the profitability of investment 
projects.  This information asymmetry can be reduced by setting-up a 
franchising network. The franchisee may be more likely able to evaluate the 
investment risk because he/she is not only the supplier of financial assets but 
also of the local market assets that show a low degree of contractibility 
resulting in high financial transaction costs for the lender (Long & Malitz, 
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1985). Therefore, contractibility of local market assets influences the impact of 
financial resources on the ownership structure. For instance, if the local 
market assets are non-contractible, high information asymmetry exists 
between the external supplier of capital and the franchisor, which leads to 
difficulties in acquiring financial resources from external suppliers to finance 
the growth of the system. Consequently, the higher the non-contractibility of 
local market assets, the higher is the positive impact of financial assets on the 
tendency toward franchising, because the franchisor’s ability to acquire 
financial resources from the external capital market decreases with more non-
contractible local market assets.  
Second, the question to ask is: Can MUF additionally mitigate the 
financial resource scarcity problem of the franchisor? MUF offers additional 
growth opportunities for the franchisor compared to SUF, because multi-unit 
franchisees are less constrained in financing local investments compared to 
the single-unit franchisees. Multi-unit franchisees have easier and less costly 
access to financial resources, because external suppliers of capital may 
charge lower risk premiums for lending due to the portfolio effect of a larger 
number of outlets, and multi-unit franchisees have a higher self-financing 
capacity than single-unit franchisees. As a result I can derive the following 
hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 6.2: The positive impact of financial assets on the 
franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with non-
contractible local market assets. 
Contractibility and System-specific Assets 
The franchisor’s intangible assets refer to the system-specific know-how and 
brand name assets as reputation capital (Hall, 1993; Kacker, 1988; Klein & 
Leffler, 1981) that are characterized by a low degree of contractibility. 
Compared to SUF systems, MUF systems have an advantage to efficiently 
exploit the system-specific know-how. MUF results in higher monitoring 
capabilities of the network compared to a system with SUF because the 
franchisor can delegate some monitoring tasks to the franchisees that have 
special market knowledge and realize economies of monitoring. In addition, 
the knowledge transfer capacity is higher under MUF compared to SUF 
because the franchisor may transfer some knowledge transfer tasks to the 
mini-networks. We conclude: The higher the degree of intangibility of system-
specific assets, the more important are the MUF system’s greater monitoring 
and knowledge transfer capabilities for the generation of the residual surplus 
of the network, and the higher is the tendency toward MUF. I derive the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6.3: Franchisor’s non-contractible system-
specific assets are positively related to franchisor’s use of multi-
unit franchising. 
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6.3 Empirical Analysis 
6.3.1 Data Collection 
Empirical data to test the hypotheses were collected from the German 
franchise sector. The directory of the German Franchise Federation (DFV) lists 
all franchise systems operating in Germany that are registered members of the 
DFV. The data were collected via self-administered questionnaire which was 
developed in several steps. After several preliminary refinements, I conducted 
in-depth interviews with franchise professionals from the Austrian and 
German Franchise Association as well as franchise consultants and a pre-test 
with 10 franchisors in Vienna. The questionnaire was mailed to 485 franchise 
systems in Germany. The response rate was 32%, providing me a sample of 
153 franchise systems. Table 6.1 presents the sector-wise distribution of the 
sample.  
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Table 6.1: Sector-wise Distribution of the Sample and the Population 
 
 
Sector  
Population Sample 
(Respondents) 
No. of 
Systems 
 
Percentage 
No. of 
Systems  
 
Percentage 
Retail Business 163 33.61 46 30.07 
Personal & Business 
Services  
149 30.72 50 32.68 
Manufacturing & Others  62 12.68 18 11.76 
Hotel & Restaurant 44 9.07 22 14.38 
Building, Construction, & 
Real Estate 
41 8.45  8 5.23 
Cleaning & Maintenance 26 5.36 9 5.88 
Total  485 100 153 100 
 
Due to missing values, only 90 responses could be used for the 
regression analysis. Non-response bias was estimated by comparing early 
versus late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977), where late 
respondents serve as proxies for non-respondents. Additionally, I was able to 
retrieve data on five variables (i.e., age, initial franchise fee, advertising fee, 
contract length, and royalties) for the entire population. I used this data to 
check whether the sample is representative. No significant differences 
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emerged between the two groups of respondents (see Table 6.2 appended 
below).  
Table 6.2: Estimate of Non-Response Bias2 - II   
 
Means, (SD), and Counts3 
 
 
Population  Respondents  t-value  p-value  
Age of  Franchise System  
(Years) 
 
16.420 
(20.796) 
N = 467 
15.032 
(20.016) 
N = 153 
-0.722 0.470 
Initial Franchise Fee  
(Thousand €) 
10.536 
(19.984) 
N = 387 
11.548 
(10.274) 
N = 126 
0.545 0.586 
Advertising Fee (% of Sales) 1.161 
(1.617) 
N = 387 
1.082 
(1.858) 
N=145 
-0.482 0.630 
Contract Length (Years) 7.550 
(3.487) 
N = 420 
7.810 
(3.731) 
N = 149 
0.774 0.439 
Royalties (% of Sales) 4.141 
(3.997) 
N = 360 
4.078 
(3.118) 
N = 140 
-0.166 0.868 
                                                 
2
 The measures of, Initial Franchise Fee, Advertising Fee, and Royalties were first tested by a 
MANOVA to ensure independence of these variables.  MANOVA was non-significant (Wilks’ 
Lambda = 1.000, p = 0.984). 
 
3
 Counts differ across different measures because of item non-response.  
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6.3.2 Measurement 
The measures of the relevant variables are summarized in the Appendix 6.1. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, proportion of multi-unit outlets (PropMUF), is 
measured as a ratio of franchised outlet to the number of franchisees. A 
similar ratio has been used in previous studies (Bercovitz, 2003; Gomez et al., 
2010; Weaven & Frazer, 2004) as an indicator for MUF.  However, some 
studies use dichotomous measures for the use of MUF (Bradach, 1995; 
Grünhagen & Mittelstaedt, 2005; Lopez-Bayon & Lopez-Fernandez, 2008; 
Robicheaux et al., 1994).   
Independent Variables 
Franchisee’s Intangible Local Market Assets (LMA): Intangible local 
market assets refer to the franchisee's local market know how (LMA). The 
higher the degree of intangibility of franchisee’s know-how, the larger is the 
local market knowledge advantage of the franchisee. Therefore, I use the 
local market knowledge advantage of the franchisee as an indicator of the 
degree of intangibility of franchisee's outlet-specific assets. In the 
questionnaire the franchisors were asked to rate on a five-point scale to 
evaluate franchisee's intangible local market assets. Consistent with previous 
studies (Cliquet, 2000b; Windsperger, 2004), I used a three-item scale to 
measure the local know-how advantage of the franchisee (see Appendix 6.1).  
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Franchisor’s Intangible System-specific Assets: They refer to 
franchisor’s specific know how and brand name capital. Based on indicators 
used in earlier studies (Argote, 2000; Darr et al., 1995; Fladmoe-Lindquist & 
Jacque, 1995), I use annual training days (ANTD) as a proxy for the 
franchisor’s intangible system-specific assets. The number of training days is 
an indicator of the importance of the franchisor’s intangible system-specific 
know-how to generate the residual income of the network. The assumption 
behind this measure is that as intangibility of system-specific assets 
increases, so does the number of days of face-to-face interaction.  As argued 
by Simonin (1999), the higher the degree of intangibility, the more personal 
(face-to-face) knowledge transfer methods are used, such as meetings, 
coaching and training. The indicator for brand name assets is advertising fee 
(ADV) that represents the intangible investments in the brand name capital 
(Lafontaine & Shaw, 2005; Windsperger, 2004).   
Franchisor’s Financial Resources Advantages (FIN): Consistent 
with previous studies (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003; Windsperger & Dant, 2006), 
the financial resources advantage of the franchisor is measured by using a 
single-item five-point Likert-type scale, where the franchisors were asked to 
rate their financial advantage through franchising. The measurement is based 
on the argument that the franchisors who do not possess enough financial 
resources to finance the system growth generally perceive a higher financial 
advantage through franchising.  
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Control Variables  
Formal Meetings (MEET): Under MUF the franchisees have more 
operational decision rights compared to SUF. In this case, the franchisor’s 
dilution of decision rights may be compensated by an increase of 
headquarters’ control. I use the annual number of formal meetings between 
the franchisor and the franchisees (MEET) as a proxy for control (e. g. 
meetings of the different commissions).  
Initial Investments (INV): They refer to the total amount (in thousand 
€) required to start up a new franchised outlet. Initial investments (including 
initial fees) are an indicator for franchisees’ transaction-specific investments 
which function as bonding and screening device (Dnes, 1992; Klein, 1996; 
Williamson, 1983). They reduce the opportunism risk for the franchisor and 
simultaneously decrease the information asymmetry between the franchisor 
and the potential franchisees. A higher amount of initial investments may be 
compensated by allotting the franchisees additional units in the network.  
System Size (OUT): The size of the system is measured by the total of 
franchised and company-owned outlets. The larger franchise systems signal a 
higher level of strength and success of the system and are more attractive for 
the prospect multi-unit franchisees. The existing research also suggests a 
positive effect of system size on its use of MUF (Gomez et al., 2010; 
Vázquez, 2008; Weaven & Frazer, 2007b; Weaven & Herington, 2007)..  
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Sector (SECT): 1 refers to services franchising and 0 to product 
franchising. Previous studies (Wadsworth & Morgan, 2003) suggest that MUF 
varies with the industry and the business sector. Since services franchising 
firms are characterized by more intangible assets compared to product 
franchising firms, they require more local knowledge transfer and monitoring 
capabilities. Hence, services firms may have a higher tendency toward MUF. 
Age (AGE): Due to the signaling effect of the established reputation 
and brand name, experienced franchisors are more likely to attract multi-unit 
franchisees compared to franchise systems in the early stages of the 
organizational life cycle. The existing research shows that the age of system 
may have a positive impact on the use of MUF (Weaven, 2009; Weaven & 
Herington, 2007). AGE is measured by the number of years since the 
franchise system was established. 
 
6.4 Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6.3 appended on the next page.   
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               I use OLS regression analysis to test the proposed model (see figure 
6.1). The dependent variable “proportion of multi-unit franchising” (PropMUF) 
is modeled as number of units per franchisee. Franchisee’s intangible local 
market assets (LMA), franchisor’s financial assets (FIN), and franchisor’s 
intangible system-specific assets (ANTD, ADV) are used as predictor 
variables. I also model the interaction effect of franchisee’s local market 
assets and franchisor’s financial assets (LMA*FIN). Formal meeting days 
(MEET), initial investment (INV), number of outlets (OUT), sector (SECT), and 
age of the system (AGE) are also included in the model as control variables. 
Hence, I estimate the following regression equation:  
PropMUF = α0 + α1FIN + α2LMA + α3ANTD  + α4LMA*FIN + α5ADV + 
α6MEET  + α7INV + α8OUT + α9SECT + α10AGE + ε 
According to the property rights theory, I propose a negative effect of 
intangible local market assets (LMA) and a positive effect of intangible 
system-specific and brand name assets (ANTD, ADV) on MUF; the impact of 
financial assets on the ownership strategy will be evaluated by (α1 + α4LMA). 
Financial assets (FIN) have a positive impact on the tendency toward MUF 
when the local market assets are more non-contractible. Table 6.4 presents 
results of the regression analysis. 
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Table 6.4: OLS Regression – Property Rights View (PRV) 
     Model 1    Model 2  
Variable 
Constant     1.459***   1.46*** 
     (0.123)   (0.122) 
 
LMA     -0.320**   -0.366*** 
     (0.131)   (0.135) 
 
FIN     -0.390***   -0.403*** 
     (0.123)   (0.124) 
 
ANTD     -0.028    -0.173 
     (0.130)   (0.144) 
 
ADV     0.125    0.126 
     (0.128)   (0.131) 
 
LMA*FIN    0.498***   0.556*** 
     (0.116)   (0.124) 
 
MEET     ----    0.259* 
         (0.134) 
 
OUT      ----    -0.021  
         (0.131) 
 
SECT     ----    -0.153 
         (0.132) 
 
INV     ----    0.188 
         (0.131) 
 
AGE     ----    -0.038 
         (0.129) 
 
Model Summary  
N     90    90 
Model F    7.632***   4.412*** 
R2     0.310    0.366 
Adjusted R2    0.269***     0.287*** 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;  *p < 0.1; Values in parentheses represent Standard Errors 
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Hypothesis 6.1 is supported by the data. LMA are negatively related to 
the franchisor’s use of MUF. Hypothesis 6.2 is also supported. As shown in 
table 6.5, LMA is a significant moderator of the impact of financial assets 
(FIN) on MUF. The slope analysis of the interaction term also supports the 
hypothesis. With an increasing level of intangible local market knowledge 
(LMA ≥ 4), FIN has a positive effect on MUF (see table 6.5). In addition, I 
proposed a positive effect of franchisor’s system-specific assets (ANTD and 
ADV) on the use of MUF but the data do not support Hypothesis 6.3. 
Furthermore, the data show that MUF is positively related to the franchisor’s 
formal meetings days (MEET) indicating that the dilution of the franchisor’s 
decision rights by MUF is compensated by an increase of control. The results 
also show that initial investments, age and sector do not have a significant 
impact on the use of MUF.  
Table 6.5: Interaction analysis 
LMA  α1+ α4*LMA 95% Confidence interval 
0 -1.11 -1.24328 -0.97672 
1 -0.823 -0.95628 -0.68972 
2 -0.536 -0.66928 -0.40272 
3 -0.249 -0.38228 -0.11572 
4 0.038 -0.09528 0.17128 
5 0.325 0.19172 0.45828 
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6.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study develops a property rights explanation of MUF and presents 
empirical results on the franchisor’s use of MUF in the German franchise 
sector. First, the empirical data suggest that franchisee’s local market assets 
and franchisor’s financial assets significantly influence franchisor’s tendency 
toward using MUF. The results of regression analysis support the hypothesis 
that intangible local market assets have a negative impact on the tendency 
toward MUF.  The franchisors are less likely to use MUF if local 
responsiveness and outlet-specific knowledge of the local partners is very 
important for the success of the business. Local market assets also show a 
significant moderating effect on the influence of financial resources on MUF. 
The more intangible local market assets are used at the outlets, the greater is 
the positive impact of financial resources on the tendency toward MUF. Due 
to the less costly access to the external capital market and the higher self-
financing capabilities, multi-unit franchisees are less constrained in financing 
local investments compared to single-unit franchisees. In addition, a positive 
influence of intangible system-specific assets on the use of MUF was 
proposed. However, the data do not support this hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
data provide some support of the positive relationship between the 
franchisor’s use of formal meetings and the tendency toward MUF. This may 
suggest that the dilution of franchisor’s decision rights under MUF is at least 
partly compensated by an increase of headquarters’ control.  
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How does this study extend the results in the literature? This research 
contributes to the franchising and organizational economics literature by 
providing a property rights explanation for the franchisor’s use of MUF. The 
empirical study from the German franchise sector provides some support that 
contractibility of assets determines franchisor’s choice between SUF and 
MUF. This study extends the literature on MUF beyond existing explanations 
that are mainly based on agency cost and transaction cost theory as well as 
resource scarcity perspectives. Compared to the agency theory that provides 
an explanation of the allocation of residual income rights under different 
incentive contracts, property rights theory provides an explanation of the 
allocation of ownership rights between the franchisor and single-unit and 
multi-unit franchisees. As stated by Hart (1995; 2003), agency theory cannot 
explain the allocation of ownership rights as residual rights of control, due to 
the complete contracting assumption. This assumption is critical for the 
explanation of asset ownership (Baker & Hubbard, 2004; Hubbard, 2008). In 
addition to the transaction cost theory property rights theory focuses on 
contractibility of assets as determinants of ownership structure. Only when the 
specific assets are non-contractible they influence the structure of ownership 
rights between the franchisor and the franchisees. Whinston (2003) criticized 
the asset specificity theory developed by Williamson (1979) and Klein, 
Crawford, & Alchian (1978), because it does not differentiate between 
contractible and non-contractible specific assets. Furthermore, compared to 
the resource scarcity view (Baker & Dant, 2008; Dant, Paswan, & Kaufmann, 
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1996), property rights theory argues that informational, financial and 
managerial resources are only relevant for the allocation of ownership rights if 
they are non-contractible (Windsperger & Dant, 2006).  
How can property rights theory advance franchising research in future? 
One promising area of application is a comparative institutional analysis of the 
allocation of residual income and ownership rights in international franchising, 
such as master franchising, area development franchising and company-
owned subsidiaries. Agency-theoretical frameworks can explain the different 
incentive contracts between the headquarters and the international network 
partners, but they are unable to explain the different ownership patterns, such 
as master franchising and area development franchising. A second area of 
application in international franchising is the investigation of the structure of 
residual decision rights between franchisor and franchisees, and the 
relationship between ownership rights and residual decision rights under the 
different international governance modes, such as multi-unit franchising and 
master franchising. 
The study may have important limitations. First, I measure all of the 
constructs from the franchisor’s point of view. Particularly, I use franchisor’s 
perception to measure local market assets. This issue may be addressed in 
the future research by collecting data from the franchisees as well. Second, 
although Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007) and Drolet and Morrison (2001) argue 
that the use of single-item scales can be justified by different reasons (e. g., 
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simplicity, convenience, and time savings for both the respondent and 
researcher), additional indicators have to be included in the empirical analysis 
to test the impact of financial resources on MUF.  
The study also has practical implications for the franchisors: If the local 
market knowledge of the network partners is of key importance, the 
franchisors should consider using a higher proportion of SUF to efficiently 
exploit the local profit opportunities. Single-unit franchisees have higher 
entrepreneurial capabilities to respond to changes in the local market 
environment. On the other hand, more multi-unit franchisees should be 
chosen to mitigate the financial scarcity problems of the franchisor because 
they have easier access to financial resources. This is especially important 
when the local market assets are non-contractible which makes it more 
difficult for the franchisor to expand by acquiring financial resources from 
external capital market.  
In the next chapter, I conclude the dissertation by discussing the 
contribution and limitations of this research and presenting some directions for 
the future research.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The objective of this research is to explain multi-unit ownership strategy of a 
franchising firm using organizational economics and strategic management 
theories. In this dissertation, I present a detailed review of literature on MUF 
and develop an integrative model based on transaction cost theory, agency 
theory, resource scarcity and organizational capabilities views, property rights 
theory, and screening theory. The empirical part partly tests the integrative 
model. The hypotheses concerning agency theory, resource-based and 
organizational capabilities views, transactions cost theory, and property rights 
theory are empirically tested using primary data from the German and the 
Austrian franchise sectors.  
First, the franchisors are more likely to use higher proportion of MUF if 
the system has highly specific assets. Brand name capital is one of the most 
important system-specific assets and needs to be protected from misuse by 
the network partners (i.e., franchisees). MUF increases the monitoring 
capabilities of the franchise system and enables the franchisor to exercise a 
higher degree of control. Hence brand name positively affects the franchisor’s 
tendency toward adoption of MUF.  Non-transferability of system-specific 
know-how also has a positive relationship with the franchisor’s use of MUF. If 
the system-specific know-how is highly non-transferable, the franchisors use 
MUF to effectively and efficiently transfer it to the local outlet level. The multi-
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising                           Chapter 7                                                   Conclusion 
Dildar Hussain                                                                                                                                                       140 
unit franchisees are larger partners and possess higher organizational 
capabilities to implement franchisor’s specific know-how in the local market. 
Additionally, franchisors can delegate some know-how transfer tasks to the 
mini-chain owners that ultimately results in system’s higher know-how transfer 
capabilities. The amount of investments required for opening up a new outlet 
has also a positive effect on the use of MUF. The higher required investments 
tend to enhance franchisor’s likelihood to use MUF due to the increased 
bonding effect.  The multi-unit franchisees have higher motivations to behave 
cooperatively as they have a higher stake involved (compared to single-unit 
franchisees) in the franchise relationship. On the other hand, they can also 
earn higher economic rents by achieving economies of scales and centralizing 
some operational activities (e.g., procurement of raw materials, advertising 
and promotion, recruitment and training) within their mini-chains.  
Environmental uncertainty is an important determinant of ownership strategy 
(Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998).  High uncertainty in the local market environment 
has a negative relationship with the franchisor’s use of MUF. In a highly 
uncertain environment, more local market knowledge is required to respond to 
the environmental changes. The single-unit franchisees are better equipped 
with local market knowledge and they can respond more quickly to any 
environmental changes as compared to larger multi-unit franchisees. 
Therefore, the results suggest that franchisors are likely to prefer SUF over 
MUF in case of a highly uncertain local environment. In consistency with the 
findings of the previous research (Weaven, 2009; Weaven & Frazer, 2007b), I 
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also evidence a positive relationship between the age of the franchise system 
and its use of MUF. 
Second, the empirical data suggest that franchisee’s intangible local 
market assets and franchisor’s financial assets significantly influence 
franchisor’s tendency toward using MUF. The results of regression analysis 
support the hypothesis that intangible local market assets have a negative 
impact on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.  The franchisors are less 
likely to use MUF if the intangible and outlet-specific knowledge of the local 
partners is very important for the success of the business. Local market 
assets also show a significant moderating effect on the influence of financial 
resources on MUF. The more intangible local market assets are used at the 
outlets, the greater is the positive impact of financial resources on the 
tendency toward MUF. Due to the less costly access to the external capital 
market and the higher self-financing capabilities, multi-unit franchisees are 
less constrained in financing local investments compared to single-unit 
franchisees. In addition, a positive influence of intangible system-specific 
assets on the use of MUF was proposed. However, the data do not support 
this hypothesis. Furthermore, the data provide some support for the positive 
relationship between the franchisor’s use of formal meetings and the tendency 
toward MUF. This may suggest that the dilution of franchisor’s decision rights 
under MUF is at least partly compensated by an increase of headquarters’ 
control.  
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7.1 Contribution to the Literature 
This study makes the following contribution to the franchising literature: 
 This research is the first of its kind to extensively review the existing 
literature on MUF and to analyze its theoretical foundations.  
 A systematic theoretical approach is applied to build the foundations for 
this research and to develop an integrative model from the 
organizational economics and strategic management theories.  The 
integrative model presents the possible extensions in the existing 
literature by developing hypotheses based on transactions cost theory, 
agency theory, resource-based and organizational capabilities views, 
property rights theory, and screening theory.  
 I use primary data from the German franchise sector and case study 
data from the Austrian franchise sector for empirical evaluation of the 
hypotheses based on agency theory, resource-based and 
organizational capabilities views, transaction cost theory, and property 
rights theory. The data from the German franchise sector enable me to 
present some generalizable findings regarding the franchisor’s use of 
MUF.  
 The application of organizational capabilities view and transaction cost 
theory offers unique and valuable explanations for the franchisor’s use 
of MUF. This attempts to address the need to apply multiple theoretical 
frameworks to explain a firm’s use of franchising (Castrogiovanni et al., 
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2006b; 2006a; Combs & Ketchen, 1999). Complementary to the 
agency-theoretical explanations, I develop organizational capabilities 
and transaction cost explanations for the choice of multi-unit ownership 
strategy in franchising networks. While the TC- theory explains the use 
of MUF primarily in terms of cost minimization, the OC-theory takes the 
position that preserving and increasing a firm’s competitive advantage 
is the primary explanation for the positive relationship between firm-
specific assets and capabilities and the use of multi-unit ownership 
strategy. I present the first empirical evidence that firm-specific assets, 
such as brand name assets and system-specific know-how, and 
transaction-specific investments of the franchisee are positively related 
to the use of MUF and environmental uncertainty is negatively related 
to the use of MUF. 
 Furthermore, I develop a property rights explanation of the use of MUF. 
The empirical data provide support that contractibility of assets 
determines franchisor’s choice between SUF and MUF. Compared to 
the agency theory that provides an explanation of the allocation of 
residual income rights under different incentive contracts, property 
rights theory provides an explanation of the allocation of ownership 
rights between the franchisor and single-unit and multi-unit franchisees. 
In addition to the transaction cost theory property rights theory focuses 
on contractibility of specific assets as determinants of ownership 
structure (Whinston, 2003). 
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7.2 Managerial Implications  
The choice of ownership strategy can have far-reaching implications for the 
survival and performance of a franchise system. A wrong decision in this 
regard may result in substantial financial and reputational loss for the system. 
This research has practical implications for the franchisors and franchisee as 
well, both partners can benefit from the findings of this research to cope with 
the management and environmental challenges.  
 If the local market knowledge of the network partners is of the key 
importance, the franchisors should consider using a higher proportion of SUF 
to efficiently exploit the local profit opportunities. Additionally, SUF may prove 
to be more successful if the environment is highly uncertain as the single-unit 
franchisees have higher entrepreneurial capabilities to respond to the 
changes in the local market environment. On the other hand, more multi-unit 
franchisees should be chosen to mitigate the financial scarcity problems of the 
franchisor because they have easier access to financial resources. This is 
especially important when the local market assets are non-contractible, which 
makes it more difficult for the franchisor to expand by acquiring financial 
resources from external capital market. The franchisors should consider using 
a higher portion of MUF if their system-specific know-how is highly non-
transferable. A higher brand name capital requires a higher level of monitoring 
and the franchisors can increase their monitoring capabilities by employing a 
higher proportion of MUF. Multi-unit franchisee can realize the economies of 
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scale in monitoring and can efficiently and effectively monitor their mini-
chains. The amount of initial investment requirement to open a new outlet also 
influences the franchisor’s choice of ownership strategy. The franchisors 
should use a higher proportion of MUF if a large amount of investments is 
required to startup a new outlet.  
In addition to franchisors, the franchisees may also learn some useful 
lessons from the results of this research. The findings may prove helpful in 
finding the best match between their own and franchisor’s preferences, 
priorities, capabilities, and resources. The franchisee that want to grow rapidly 
should consider entering into a franchise relationship with franchisors that 
have a strong brand as these franchisors are more likely to employ a higher 
proportion of MUF. On the other hand, the franchisee should not expect a 
rapid growth in terms of units if the franchisor places more emphasis on local 
market knowledge and local responsiveness. In such a case, the franchisor is 
likely to dominantly pursue a single-unit strategy.  
 
7.3 Directions for the Future Research 
The future research in franchising should focus on the following issues:  
 Employing time series data to investigate the franchisors’ motivations 
behind their choice of franchising ownership strategy may result in 
more valid and more generalizable findings.  
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 Since the franchisor’s objective of the choice of governance structure is 
to maximize the residual surplus, future research has to investigate the 
extent to which franchisor’s choice of franchising ownership strategy 
affects the performance of the franchise system.  
 
 The franchise systems applying a plural form strategy (employing both 
company ownership and franchising simultaneously) perform better 
than predominately franchised or predominately company-owned 
systems (Perrigot, Cliquet, & Piot-Lepetit, 2009; Ehrmann & Spranger, 
2004). The plural ownership strategy helps franchise systems to 
implement both control and incentives within the network (Cliquet & 
Croizean, 2002). On the other hand, MUF increases the bargaining 
power of the mini-chain owners. Thus, the use of company-owned 
outlets and MUF is a simultaneous decision problem for the franchisor. 
Future research has to investigate the relationship between the 
different ownership strategies of franchise firms. 
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Appendix 1:  Abstract  
 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising  
Franchising is a popular organizational form and its role in national economies 
has been well recognized by the researchers. Many franchising researchers 
attribute the recent growth in franchising to the emergence of multi-unit 
franchising (an organizational arrangement where one franchisee owns two or 
more outlets in the same franchise system). The objective of this research is 
to explain franchisor’s choice between multi-unit franchising and single-unit 
franchising (traditional one-franchisee one-outlet format) using organizational 
economics and strategic management theories. This dissertation is divided 
into two main parts.  
The first part comprises of two studies that present a detailed literature 
review and develop an integrative model to explain franchisor’s use of MUF. 
The findings of the literature review suggest that the previous studies mainly 
use agency theoretical framework to explain this ownership strategy in 
franchising. Although some studies also apply resource-based view but the 
primary research deficit results from the lack of systematic application of 
these theories. As an attempt to address this research gap, I develop an 
integrative model based on transaction cost theory, agency theory, resource-
based and organizational capabilities views, property rights theory, and 
screening theory.  
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The second part of the dissertation presents three studies to 
empirically test some parts of the proposed integrative model. In the first 
study, I employ a comparative case analysis method to test the predictions 
concerning agency theory, resource-based and organizational capabilities 
views, and transaction cost theory. The findings suggest that franchisor’s 
multi-unit franchising strategy can be explained by franchisee’s transaction-
specific investments, franchisor’s system-specific assets, and franchisor’s 
financial resources scarcity. The second study uses quantitative data from the 
German franchise sector to empirically test the hypotheses concerning 
organizational capabilities view and transaction cost theory. The findings 
support hypotheses proposing positive effects of brand name capital, 
knowledge transfer capabilities, and franchisee’s transaction-specific 
investments on the use of multi-unit franchising. The negative influence of 
environmental uncertainty on the franchisor’s multi-unit ownership strategy is 
also supported. The third empirical study develops a property rights 
explanation of the multi-unit ownership strategy of a franchise firm. According 
to the property rights theory, the structure of ownership rights depends on the 
contractibility of assets. Empirical results from the German franchise sector 
provide support of the hypotheses predicting negative effect of non-
contractibility of local market assets on the use of multi-unit franchising. In 
addition, the positive impact of financial assets on the tendency toward multi-
unit franchising increases with non-contractibility of local market assets. 
Compared to the agency theory, which focuses on (complete) incentive 
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contracts that specify residual income rights between the franchisor and 
franchisee, property rights theory focuses on incomplete contracts that 
allocate ownership rights between the franchisor and network partners. 
Furthermore, compared to the transaction and resource-based theory, 
property rights theory examines the impact of contractibility of 
resources/assets on the ownership structure. Only non-contractible 
resources/assets determine the structure of ownership rights. 
This research contributes to the existing literature on multi-unit 
franchising by presenting an extensive literature review, developing an 
integrative model, and providing some new explanations for the franchisor’s 
use of multi-unit franchising. This research also bears practical implications 
for the franchising practitioners (franchisors and franchisees). The future 
research may be directed to find alternative theoretical explanations for the 
use of multi-unit franchising. In addition, it may also be interesting to integrate 
the performance of the franchise networks into the theoretical explanations 
behind the use of different ownership strategies within the franchising setting.   
 
Key words: Organizational structure; multi-unit franchising; organizational 
capabilities view; transaction cost theory; property rights theory; comparative 
case analysis; empirical analysis  
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Appendix 2: Abstract in Deutsch  
 
Multi-unit Franchising als Eigentumsstrategie 
Die Expansion von Franchise-Unternehmen wurde in den letzten Jahren sehr 
stark durch Multi-unit Franchising (d.h. ein Franchisenehmer hat mehrere 
Outlets) unterstützt. Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist die Wahl zwischen Multi-
unit Franchising und Single-unit Franchising (d.h. der Franchisenehmer hat 
nur einen Outlet) mit Hilfe von organisationsökonomischen und strategischen 
Ansätzen zu erklären. Die Dissertation ist in zwei Teilen aufgebaut: 
Der erste Teil der Arbeit besteht aus zwei Studien. Erstens wird ein 
Überblick über die relevante Literatur gegeben. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die 
meisten Untersuchungen auf agency-theoretischen Ansätzen basieren. Einige 
Studien leiten auch Hypothesen vom ressourcen-orientierten Ansatz ab. Die 
Forschungslücke besteht darin, dass es keine umfassende theoretische 
Erklärung von Multi-unit Franchising gibt, die sowohl 
organisationsökonomische und strategische Ansätze integriert. Um diese 
Forschungslücke zu schließen, wurde ein integratives Modell basierend auf 
Transaktionskostentheorie, Agencytheorie, Property Rights-Theorie, 
Screeningtheorie sowie ressourcenorientierte und ‚Organzational 
Capabilities’- Ansätze entwickelt. 
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit besteht aus drei Studien, die Property 
Rights-, Transaktionskosten-, Agencykosten - und Organizational 
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Capabilities-Hypothesen entwickeln und testen In der ersten Arbeit wird eine 
komparative Fallstudienanalyse durchgeführt. Die empirischen Befunde der 
beiden Franchiseunternehmen (Coffeeshop Company und Testa Rossa) sind 
mit den von Agencytheorie, Transaktionskostentheorie und 
ressourcenorientierten Theorie abgeleiteten Hypothesen weitgehend 
kompatibel. In der zweiten Studie werden Transaktionskosten- und 
Organizational Capabilities-Hypothesen mit Hilfe von Daten deutscher 
Franchise-Unternehmen getestet. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen die 
Transaktionskosten- und die Organizational Capabilities-Hypothesen. Die 
dritte Studie presentiert eine Property Rights-Erklärung von Multi-unit 
Franchising. Nach der Property Rights-Theorie hängt die Struktur der 
Eigentumsrechte von der Kontrahierbarkeit des systemspezifischen Know-
how und der lokalen Marktknow-how ab. Die empirische Ergebnisse 
bestätigen den negativen Zusammenhang zwischen intangiblem Marktknow-
how und der Tendenz zu Multi-unit Franchising. Ferner bestätigen die 
Ergebnisse, dass die finanziellen Ressourcen des Multi-unit-
Franchisenehmers nur dann die Tendenz zu Multi-unit Franchising 
beeinflussen, wenn die Informationsasymmetrie zwischen Franchisenehmer 
und potentiellen Fremdkaptialgebern aufgrund des intangiblen lokalen 
Marktwissens sehr groß ist.  
Die vorliegende Arbeit liefert folgenden Beitrag zur Forschung: Erstens 
wird ein umfassender Überblick über die relevante Literatur zum Multi-unit 
Franchising in den letzten 30 Jahren gegeben. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die 
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Forschungslücke in der unzureichenden theoretischen Fundierung der 
bisherigen empirischen Befunde besteht. Ausgehend von diesem Defizit wird 
ein integratives Modell zur Erklärung von Multi-unit Franchising abgeleitet.  
Zweitens wird Multi-unit Franchising mit Hilfe von Hypothesen aus der 
Transaktionskostentheorie, ‚Organizational Capabilities’-Theorie und Property 
Rightstheorie zu erklären versucht. Die empirischen Befunde vom deutschen 
Franchisesektor bestätigen die Transaktionskosten-, ‚Organizational 
Capabilities’ und teilweise die Property Rigths-Hypothesen.  
 
Key words: Multi-unit Franchising, ‘Organizational Capabilities’, 
Transaktionskosten, Property Rights-Theorie, Fallstudienanalyse, empirische 
Analyse, Franchisesektor in Deutschland. 
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Appendix 3: Abbreviations 
(Sorted in alphabetical order)  
AT  Agency theory 
CEO  Chief executive officer 
CFA   Confirmatory factor analysis  
DFV  Deustche Franchise-Verband (German Franchise Federation)  
EFF  European Franchise Federation 
HRM  Human resource management 
MU  Multi-unit 
MUF   Multi-unit franchising  
OC  Organizational capabilities  
OLS  Ordinary least squares  
PRV  Property rights view 
RB  Resource-based 
SD  Standard deviation  
SU  Single-unit 
SUF  Single-unit franchising  
TC  Transaction cost 
UFOC  Uniform franchise offering circular  
USA  United States of America  
USP  Unique selling proposition 
WFC  World Franchise Council 
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Appendix 5.1:  Measurement of Variables-I 
 
Multi-unit Franchising (PropMUF): Number of franchised outlets/number of 
franchisees 
Franchisee’s Transaction-specific Investments (INV): Initial investments 
(excluding initial fees) required to start a new franchised outlet. 
Environmental Uncertainty (ENV): 
Three items, measured on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1 strongly 
disagree – 7 strongly agree), Cronbach’s alpha = 0.738 
1. The sales at the outlet level are very fluctuating.  
2. It is very difficult to predict the market development at the 
outlet level. 
3. The economic environment in the local market changes 
frequently. 
Brand (BRAND): 
Four items, measured on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1 strongly 
disagree – 7 strongly agree), Cronbach’s alpha = 0.815 
1. Our brand is very strong compared to our competitors. 
2. Our franchise system enjoys higher brand recognition 
compared to our competitors.  
3. Our franchise system enjoys a good reputation for quality.  
4. Our brand name is very important for us for achieving 
competitive advantage. 
Multi-unit Ownership Strategy in Franchising                                                                                                 Appendices  
Dildar Hussain                              178 
 
Transferability of System-specific Know-how (TRF): 
Seven items, measured on a 7 point rating scale (1 not at all difficult – 
7 very difficult), Cronbach’s alpha = 0.924. The franchisors were asked 
to rate that how difficult it is to transfer ……..to the franchisees: 
1. Marketing know-how  
2. Organizational know-how  
3. Administrative know-how  
4. Quality management know-how  
5. Accounting know-how  
6. Human resource know-how  
7. IT know-how  
Sector (SECT): 0 = Product franchising firms;  1 = Services firms 
System Size (SIZE):  Total number of outlets in the franchise system 
(franchised + company owned)  
Age (AGE):   Number of years since opening up the first franchised outlet in 
Germany. 
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Appendix 6.1:  Measures of Variables-II 
 
Proportion of Multi-unit Franchising (PropMUF): Number of franchised 
outlets/number of franchisees 
Annual Training Days (ANTD): Number of franchisee’s training days a year 
Advertising Fee (ADV): Advertising fee as percentage of the sales 
Franchisee’s Intangible Local Market Assets (LMA): 
(Three items; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.624): Franchisee’s know-how 
advantage evaluated by the franchisor (no advantage 1 – 5 very large 
advantage) regarding 
4. Innovation 
5. Local market knowledge 
6. Quality control 
Financial Resources Advantages (FIN): Franchisor’s financial resources 
advantage through franchising (no advantage 1 – 5 very large advantage). 
Formal Meetings (MEET): Number of formal meeting days a year 
Outlets (OUT): Total number of outlets in the franchise system (franchised + 
company owned)  
Initial Investments (INV): Sum of initial investments and initial fees 
Sector (SECT): 1 = Services firms; 0 = Product franchising firms 
Age (AGE):  The number of year since opening up the first franchised outlet 
in Germany. 
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